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DISTRICT COURT EN BANCS
Maggie Gardner*
Despite the image of the solitary federal district judge, there is a long but
quiet history of federal district courts deciding cases en banc. District court
en bancs predate the development of en banc rehearings by the federal courts
of appeals and have been used to address some of the most pressing issues
before federal courts over the last one hundred years: Prohibition
prosecutions, bankruptcies during the Great Depression, labor unrest in the
1940s, protracted desegregation cases, asbestos litigation, and the
constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, to name a few. This
Article gathers more than 140 examples of voluntary collective adjudication
by district judges, supplemented by interviews with sitting judges who
participated in recent cases. While the Article’s aim is primarily descriptive
and doctrinal, it also defends the occasional and disciplined use of such
proceedings as enabling deliberation about and increasing the legitimacy of
high-stakes district court decisions.
More broadly, the Article celebrates the distinct voice of the district courts
and their procedural innovations. The district courts handle the vast
majority of the federal judiciary’s business and bear the brunt of new legal
and societal challenges; their ingenuity is often the vanguard for procedural
and administrative reform. Indeed, the story of district court en bancs is also
the story of the federal courts’ constant evolution. The current settlement of
the federal courts’ institutional design is the product of shifting pressures
and compromises, and it would be foolish to assume that the status quo is
either perfect now or will continue to function effectively despite changing
conditions. In a moment of renewed attention to the federal judiciary, district
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court en bancs may helpfully challenge our assumptions about the structure
of the federal courts and the power of district judges within them.
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INTRODUCTION
Most U.S. lawyers (and much of the general public) are aware of federal
appellate court en bancs.1 But few people—including district judges2—are
aware that there is a longer, albeit more infrequent, history of federal district
court en bancs.3 District court en bancs differ in key ways from their
appellate counterparts: there is no formal authorization or set procedure for
district court en bancs,4 they are almost always judge-initiated,5 and they
vary in format and in the number of judges who participate.6 Most
fundamentally, district court en bancs serve not to reconsider decisions but
to decide an issue or a case collectively in the first instance.7
1. Judicial opinions and statutes refer interchangeably to “en banc” and “in banc”
sessions of the federal courts. Compare FED. R. APP. P. 35 (“en banc”), with 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)
(“in banc”). For consistency, this Article uses the currently more common term, “en banc.”
2. This Article refers to district judges (rather than district court judges) because, for the
first hundred years of the lower federal courts, district judges staffed both district and original
circuit courts. See infra Part I.A.1.
3. Even some district judges who have themselves participated in district court en bancs
have assumed that their use of the procedure was sui generis. See JACK BASS, TAMING THE
STORM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR. AND THE SOUTH’S FIGHT OVER
CIVIL RIGHTS 209 (1993) (quoting Judge Johnson as noting, “There’s no statutory basis or any
other legal basis of which I’m aware that authorizes a five-judge District Court” like the one
that issued United States v. Wallace, 222 F. Supp. 485 (M.D. Ala. 1963), and opining that
“[t]here’s never been another one anywhere”); Telephone Interview with U.S. District Judge
(June 22, 2020) (noting that the judge “hasn’t ever heard of it happening anywhere else”).
4. Federal appellate en bancs are governed by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the local rules of the circuit courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c);
FED. R. APP. P. 35; see, e.g., 9TH CIR. R. 35-1 to 35-4. In contrast, no statute or Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure explicitly authorizes district court en bancs, and I am not aware of any
district’s local rules currently providing for en banc hearings or decisions. One district’s
bankruptcy rules, however, do allow the bankruptcy judges to sit en banc. See BANKR. W.D.
OKLA. R. 7052-1 (“Upon request of a judge of the Court, or upon motion, any matter may be
heard en banc if all judges of the Court concur.”).
5. In contrast, litigants may petition for rehearing en banc before the appellate courts,
although a judge on the court must call for the vote on whether the petition should be granted,
which must in turn be approved by a majority of the court’s active members. See FED. R. APP.
P. 35.
6. See Appendix; infra Part I.C.1. In contrast, appellate en bancs involve all active
judges (and sometimes senior judges) hearing oral arguments together and participating in the
decision. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). Only the Ninth Circuit holds en banc hearings with fewer
than all of its active judges, pursuant to discretion granted for the largest circuits under
28 U.S.C. § 46(c). See 9TH CIR. R. 35-3 (describing selection of eleven-judge en banc panels
by lot).
7. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure specify that the purpose of an appellate en
banc hearing is to reconsider a prior panel decision, either to maintain uniformity within the
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Because the practice of district court en bancs has been ad hoc, the precise
procedure has varied across courts and cases.8 Most examples involve all or
most of the district’s judges participating in a collective hearing and
decision.9 Other examples have involved fewer than all of the district’s
judges, either via ad hoc panels10 or by coordinating decisions in related
cases.11 Yet other examples involve a district’s judges signing onto or
adopting the decision of a single colleague.12 Given that line-drawing
between these variations can be difficult, this Article uses the purposefully
broad category of voluntary collective district court adjudication.13
Decisions in this category are connected by the voluntariness of the
procedure, meaning that no statute or federal rule requires the judges to
decide the case together, and by their collective nature, with more than one
district judge joining in a single opinion.14
This Article gathers more than 140 examples of voluntary collective
adjudication by district courts since 1912,15 supplemented by interviews with
circuit’s law or to address “a question of exceptional importance,” including the possible
creation of a circuit split. FED. R. APP. P. 35.
8. These variations are more formally categorized and described with examples in Part
I.C.1.
9. See, e.g., Angle v. Legislature of Nev., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1154 (D. Nev. 2003)
(all seven judges of the district declining to intervene in a dispute between the state legislature
and the state supreme court), aff’d sub nom. Amodei v. Nev. State Senate, 99 F. App’x 90 (9th
Cir. 2004).
10. See generally Olivieri v. Adams, 280 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (delegated panel
considering the permissibility of pendent party jurisdiction).
11. See generally United States v. Wallace, 222 F. Supp. 485 (M.D. Ala. 1963) (all federal
judges in Alabama coordinating across district lines to enjoin George Wallace and others from
continuing to violate court orders regarding desegregation).
12. See, e.g., Dziwanoski v. Ocean Carriers Corp., 26 F.R.D. 595, 599 (D. Md. 1960)
(noting that the authoring judge was “authorized by [the other two judges of the district] to
say that they concur in this opinion” regarding the plaintiff’s right to have an attorney present
during a Rule 35 medical examination).
13. For ease of reference, this Article uses “collective proceedings,” “collective
decisions,” and occasionally the more colloquial “district court en bancs” as shorthand for the
overarching category of voluntary collective district court adjudication.
14. I have also excluded from the appendix examples of attorney discipline cases in which
a district court’s local rules require a hearing before a three-judge panel. While I still consider
collective adjudication mandated by local rules to be “voluntary” in that the district court can
opt to change its rules, enough district courts have at times adopted local rules requiring
three-judge disciplinary panels to make their inclusion here impractical.
15. See Appendix. The only prior analysis of district court en bancs is a brief essay by
Judge John R. Bartels, who identified thirty-eight reported en banc decisions and another nine
examples of en banc panels that had not issued decisions. See John R. Bartels, United States
District Courts En Banc—Resolving the Ambiguities, 73 JUDICATURE, no. 1, 1989, at 40; see
id. at 40 n.2 (defining district court en bancs as “any district court in which two or more judges
either joined in or bound themselves to a single opinion”). Although Judge Bartels did not list
all his examples, I estimate that our lists overlap by no more than thirty-six cases. See infra
Part I.C.2. Other scholars have at times acknowledged district court en bancs in passing, but
without considering their history, function, or legitimacy. See 32 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts
§ 523 (2021) (noting that “[a] district court may also occasionally hold an en banc session, or
convene a panel of judges” (footnote omitted)); 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3505 (3d ed. 2021)
(“The statutes do not forbid, and some districts on occasion follow, the practice of having all
the judges of the [district] court sit en banc in important matters or of designating a panel of
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seven district judges who participated in more recent cases. The list in the
appendix is assuredly underinclusive, as no publisher or database labels or
tracks district court en bancs. But the results are sufficient to establish that,
although uncommon, collective proceedings before district courts have been
a relatively consistent phenomenon over the modern history of the federal
courts.
In excavating and analyzing this phenomenon, this Article furthers two
important conversations about courts and procedure. First, district court en
bancs provide a new perspective on the political-institutional development of
the federal courts. As scholars since Felix Frankfurter and James Landis have
documented, the evolution of the federal courts is intertwined with
continuing debates about federalism, the separation of powers, and
significant shifts in American society.16 Not surprisingly, district courts have
experimented with collective decisions at moments of great political and
institutional pressure over the last century: district court en bancs have
addressed Prohibition prosecutions, bankruptcy reforms during the Great
Depression, labor unrest, desegregation, and mass torts; they have been used
to navigate relations with the higher courts, the executive branch, the states,
and the broader public.17 The proper role of the district court within the
federal judiciary and U.S. public life has always been contested and
contingent: even today, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken to micromanaging
district court dockets,18 while scholars and judges are casting doubt on
several judges . . . to establish uniformity within the district on recurring questions.” (footnote
omitted)); BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 515 (2016) (noting
“rare instances when the judges of a federal district court sit en banc”); Recent Case, Federal
Courts. Jurisdiction. Propriety of Additional Judges Sitting Where Only One Is Necessary,
48 HARV. L. REV. 132, 133 (1934) [hereinafter Recent Case] (“[T]he opinions indicate that
more than one [district] judge has often sat in cases where no statute authorized a three-judge
court.”); Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEV.
L.J. 787, 809–10 (2012) (suggesting district court en bancs, although “extremely rare,” could
be used to establish “law of the district”); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on
the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1416
n.172 (1998) (acknowledging district court en bancs as “unusual, interesting, and arguably
unauthorized”); Ahmed E. Taha, How Panels Affect Judges: Evidence from United States
District Courts, 39 RICH. L. REV. 1235, 1244–47 (2005) (noting a few prior examples before
analyzing en banc decisions regarding the constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines).
16. The seminal work on the social and political forces behind the development of the
federal courts is FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1927). More recent works in this vein
include STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017); JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE
JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2012); PETER
GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1973); and CHARLES
GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF
AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2008).
17. See infra Parts II, III.D.
18. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133
HARV. L. REV. 123, 124 (2019) (noting recent requests by the U.S. Solicitor General asking
“the Court (1) to hear certain appeals before the lower courts have finished ruling; (2) to halt
the effect of lower court rulings pending the Supreme Court’s review; or (3) to jump over the
courts of appeals and directly issue writs of mandamus to rein in perceived abuses by different
district courts”); see also Little v. Reclaim Idaho, 140 S. Ct. 2616, 2618–19 (2020)
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district judges’ remedial powers.19 The story of district court en bancs
reminds us that daring procedural innovation lies behind much of what we
take for granted today, from appellate court en bancs to multidistrict
litigation. When confronting current challenges in the administration of
justice, we need not be locked into the current arrangement of judicial roles
and court structures.
Second, district court en bancs are an overlooked example of ad hoc
procedure, the propriety of which has been described as “the biggest question
currently brewing in civil-procedure scholarship.”20 Ad hoc procedure is
designed on the fly, after a problem has developed and often in the context
of specific litigation.21 It is pragmatic, flexible, and discretionary—which
also means it can be unpredictable, unaccountable, and insensitive to due
process or separation of powers concerns.22 As an unexplored example of ad
hoc procedure that nonetheless has a long history, district court en bancs can
help refine scholars’ recent efforts to indicate when ad hoc procedure is
beneficial, when it may be problematic, and when (or whether) it should be
codified.
Part I defines the phenomenon. It distinguishes district court en bancs
from mandatory collective adjudication (like statutory three-judge courts)
and forms of collective administration (like local rulemaking). It then
narrows the Article’s focus to voluntary collective district court adjudication
and defines four subtypes: (1) full en banc decisions, (2) panel decisions, (3)
coordinated decisions, and (4) adopted decisions. Part I also establishes
district courts’ authority to engage in such ad hoc proceedings but argues that
the resulting decisions have no more precedential weight than other district
court opinions.
Part II provides a chronological account of district court en bancs that
illustrates how en bancs have coincided with pressure points for the federal
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (objecting to eighth stay pending appeal granted by the Supreme
Court in 2020).
19. See generally Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National
Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417 (2017). For scholarship questioning the premises of the
“national injunction” debate and reaffirming the power of the courts to grant relief that affects
nonparties, see generally Zachary D. Clopton, National Injunctions and Preclusion, 118 MICH.
L. REV. 1 (2019); Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1065 (2018); Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions, Civil Rights, and the National Injunction,
131 HARV. L. REV. F. 56 (2017); Portia Pedro, Toward Establishing a Pre-Extinction
Definition of “Nationwide Injunctions,” 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 847 (2020); James E. Pfander &
Jacob P. Wentzel, The Common Law Origins of Ex parte Young, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1269
(2020); Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920
(2020).
20. Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, 129 YALE L.J. 2, 72 (2019).
21. See Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767,
784 (2017) (defining “ad hoc procedure” as procedure “motivated by a problem (or problems)
that is specific to a case or set of cases and . . . [that] addresses that problem in the midst of a
faltering pending litigation”).
22. See Engstrom, supra note 20, at 9–10 (gathering literature on both sides of the debate);
Shirin Sinnar, Procedural Experimentation and National Security in the Courts, 106 CALIF.
L. REV. 991, 1037–38 (2018) (encouraging the use of flexible procedure in the context of
government secrecy claims but voicing caution regarding possible abuses).
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courts over the last century, including bankruptcy administration in the
1930s, labor unrest in the 1940s, civil rights litigation in the 1960s, and mass
tort litigation in the 1980s. Part III provides a functional account of district
court en bancs, comparing them to procedural alternatives for achieving
similar ends. Other procedural innovations have largely displaced the need
for district court en bancs as a tool for furthering judicial economy and
intradistrict uniformity. But, district courts have not developed as many
alternatives for leveraging their collective wisdom or enhancing the
legitimacy of their opinions.
Part IV turns from the past to the future. At a time when states, the
executive branch, and the federal courts are once again in tension regarding
issues of critical national importance, the occasional (and careful) use of
collective district court en bancs might be an appropriate tool for enhancing
the deliberation and legitimacy of district court decisions. Part IV thus
explores best practices for district court en bancs that respect the limits of
district courts’ inherent authority and balance the costs imposed by such
proceedings.
I. DEFINING DISTRICT COURT EN BANCS
This part distinguishes district court en bancs from other forms of
collective judicial work, defends the authority of district courts to engage in
district court en bancs, and describes the methodology by which examples of
such cases were identified.
A. Distinguishing Other Forms of Collective Decision-Making
Since the First Judiciary Act, Congress has called on district judges to
work collectively in certain circumstances.23 These collective duties have
helped familiarize district judges with the benefits (and potentially the
challenges) of collaborative decision-making, although they are distinct from
the voluntary collective decision-making that is the focus of the remainder of
this Article.
1. The Common Law and the Original Circuit Courts
The idea that courts of first instance might, at times, decide cases
collectively is rooted in the English common-law tradition.24 Individual
judges in England could try cases at nisi prius, or locally where the cause of
action arose, but “attacks on the pleadings prior to trial—for instance,
demurrers—were heard and decided by the court in banc” in London, and
parties who lost before the local jury could “apply to the court in banc for

23. See infra Part I.A.1.
24. Panels of judges are also often used in the civil law tradition. See, e.g., Charles H.
Koch, Jr., The Advantages of the Civil Law Judicial Design as the Model for Emerging Legal
Systems, 11 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 139, 148 (2004).
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relief,” for example, by requesting a new trial.25 These applications by
parties were not appeals; the “in banc” court was not reviewing the work of
a lower court but rather finishing the work that a single judge had undertaken
on its behalf.26 Some U.S. states adopted this common-law tradition; for
example, into the twentieth century, Pennsylvania required at least two of the
three judges of the Philadelphia court to decide motions for new trials.27
Given the Conformity Act of 1872,28 which required federal courts to apply
state court procedure in actions at law,29 this state requirement likely explains
why the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued numerous self-described “en
banc” decisions in the 1920s regarding routine new trial motions.30
Perhaps also reflecting this common-law tradition, Congress initially
designed the inferior federal courts to require district judges to decide some
cases collectively. The First Judiciary Act created “two tiers of trial courts”:
the district courts and the circuit courts.31 While district judges sat
independently to hold district court, they were supposed to sit alongside
Supreme Court justices as three-judge panels to hold circuit court.32 These
original circuit courts had some appellate jurisdiction, but their primary role
was to serve as a court of first instance for weightier cases (for example,

25. RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1680
(13th ed. 2020); see also SIR JOHN BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY
91–93 (5th ed. 2019).
26. BAKER, supra note 25, at 149 (noting that “all these powers [in banc] were exercised
before judgment, and not by a court of appeal”). Another example is the Exchequer Chamber,
which could collectively consider difficult questions that arose at the local assizes; however,
“[t]he assembled judges [of the Exchequer Chamber] had no jurisdiction to decide such cases,”
so their role was one of “merely advising the judge who sought their opinion.” Id. In an
interesting parallel, the U.S. Judicial Conference, as originally conceived, took on a similar
advising role. See FISH, supra note 16, at 71 (“The Conference provided an apt vehicle for
pronouncements on issues of law which had not yet reached the highest court of
adjudication.”).
27. 12 PA. STAT. & CONS. STAT. ANN. § 680 (West 1931).
28. Ch. 255, 17 Stat. 196.
29. See FIELD ET AL., supra note 25, at 20–22.
30. See Haveron v. Bantivoglio, 13 F.2d 644 (E.D. Pa. 1926); Dodge v. F.A.D. Andrea,
Inc., 10 F.2d 387 (E.D. Pa. 1926); Tabas v. Emergency Fleet Corp., 9 F.2d 648 (E.D. Pa.
1926); Ben-Wat Corp. v. David Lupton’s Sons Co., 9 F.2d 928 (E.D. Pa. 1925); Chalmers v.
Kolb, 9 F.2d 924 (E.D. Pa. 1925); Park Amusement Co. v. McCaughn, 14 F.2d 553 (E.D. Pa.
1925); Wilderman v. Roth, 9 F.2d 637 (E.D. Pa. 1925); Carnill v. Lederer, 298 F. 462 (E.D.
Pa. 1924); Makiver v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 296 F. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1924). Because these en
banc proceedings appear to have been required as a matter of state procedural law, I have not
included them in the appendix.
31. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 21 (7th ed. 2015).
32. See id. Given the burden this imposed on Supreme Court justices, Congress reduced
the panel requirement to one justice and one district judge in 1793, and by 1802, allowed the
circuit courts to be held by a single district judge. See id. at 26–27. Given geographic
constraints and court workloads, many circuit court sessions were held by single district
judges, undermining the intention behind the design of the dual-court system. See
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 16, at 32, 69, 77, 87 (noting concerns throughout the
nineteenth century about circuit courts being held by a single district judge).
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diversity cases in which the amount in controversy was greater than $500).33
Indeed, after Congress created the circuit courts of appeal in 1891, the “old”
circuit courts only sat as courts of first instance until they were fully phased
out at the end of 1911.34 Since then, district judges have continued to gain
experience with panel decision-making through sitting by designation on the
“new” circuit courts of appeals.35
2. Three-Judge Courts
As the old circuit courts were phased out, Congress began adopting
three-judge court requirements for specific sets of cases. In 1903, Congress
required three-judge panels for some antitrust actions (though the panels
were comprised primarily of circuit judges); in 1906, it did the same for suits
to set aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission.36 But the big
expansion came in 1910 in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex
parte Young,37 which recognized the power of the federal courts to enjoin
state officers from enforcing unconstitutional state statutes.38 Concerned
about the district courts’ power to block Progressive Era reforms in the
states,39 Congress directed that requests for preliminary injunctions to
prevent state officials from enforcing state laws must be heard by three-judge
panels, which would include at least one circuit judge or Supreme Court
justice and could be appealed directly to the Supreme Court.40 Then in 1937,
worried that federal judges were too readily striking down New Deal
legislation as well, Congress expanded the use of such three-judge panels to
suits seeking to enjoin congressional statutes as unconstitutional.41
33. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 31, at 22–23; see also FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra
note 16, at 13 (“The district and circuit courts were in practice two nisi prius courts dealing
with different items of litigation.”).
34. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 31, at 30 n.66.
35. See, e.g., Marin K. Levy, Visiting Judges, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 67, 69–70 (2019).
36. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 31, at 1090 n.2; PETER CHARLES HOFFER ET AL., THE
FEDERAL COURTS: AN ESSENTIAL HISTORY 221 (2016); see also Michael T. Morley, Vertical
Stare Decisis and Three-Judge District Courts, 108 GEO. L.J. 699, 724–25 (2020) (describing
later extensions of this requirement for challenges to rate-setting by other federal agencies).
37. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
38. See generally id.
39. See David P. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation,
32 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1964) (“[T]he states, experimenting with a variety of novel regulatory
and tax measures to cope with the needs of the new industrial world, were encountering
stubborn obstacles in the persons of federal judges who insisted on reading their own
economic theories into the due process and commerce clauses.”). For more on the
contemporary context of Ex parte Young, in which the strongly Progressive state government
of Minnesota was attempting to rein in the railroads, see Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex
parte Young, and the Fate of the Three-Judge District Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101, 107–10
(2008). For a recent account tracing the origins of Ex parte Young to common law writs used
to check government power, see generally Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 19.
40. See, e.g., HOFFER ET AL., supra note 36, at 221–22; Morley, supra note 36, at 728–29;
Solimine, supra note 39, at 113–17.
41. Morley, supra note 36, at 734; Solimine, supra note 39, at 124–25. Further, whenever
a district judge held a federal statute unconstitutional, whether or not an injunction was
involved, any party could appeal directly to the Supreme Court. See Morley, supra note 36, at
735.
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Litigation before three-judge courts grew from about fifty cases per year
in the 1950s, to ninety per year in the early 1960s, to a high of 320 cases in
1973 alone.42 By the 1960s, Professor Michael Solimine has argued, the
three-judge court had shifted from serving as a shield for states following Ex
parte Young to serving as a sword against states in the civil rights era.43
Desegregation cases, for example, often challenged state statutes, requiring
hearings before three-judge courts—a requirement that civil rights attorneys
appreciated, according to Solimine, because “it negated the prospect of a
single, possibly unsympathetic, judge hearing the case, and because three
judges were more likely to take the bolder legal steps, on both the merits and
remedies, that the cases demanded,” while also providing a quicker route to
the Supreme Court.44 Congress also expanded the use of three-judge courts
in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1964.45
The use of three-judge courts, however, was sharply curtailed in 1976 with
the repeal of the 1910 and 1937 statutes, a move meant to reduce the burden
on the Supreme Court docket generated by direct review of three-judge
courts.46 Today, three-judge courts are primarily used to hear constitutional
challenges to the reapportionment of political districts under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2284; as a result, there is an uptick in three-judge courts in the years
following each decennial census.47 Other minor pockets of three-judge
courts remain due to specific statutory provisions.48
Parallel to this history of three-judge courts involving both district and
circuit judges, Congress has also authorized three-judge courts composed
entirely of district judges. For example, 16 U.S.C. § 831x (repealed in 1968)
allowed three district judges to hear exceptions to compensation awards
issued by the Tennessee Valley Authority as part of its condemnation
proceedings.49 For certain constitutional claims regarding free trade
agreements, the U.S. Court of International Trade must convene a
three-judge panel.50 Professor Michael Morley, in his recent history of
three-judge courts, also notes that “the Legislative Branch Appropriations
Act of 2006 authorizes a three-judge district court panel to determine whether
Congress’s ordinary operations have been disrupted by a national
catastrophe, but does not allow for appellate review in any court, including
the U.S. Supreme Court.”51
Solimine, supra note 39, at 126.
See id. at 134.
Id. at 127.
See id. at 131–33.
See Morley, supra note 36, at 744 (tracing decline of three-judge courts).
See 20 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE DESKBOOK § 52 n.15 (2d ed. 2019).
48. See 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4235 n.5 (3d ed. 2021) (gathering examples of “a few
other rare instances in which an Act of Congress requires a three-judge court”).
49. See id. (discussing 16 U.S.C. § 831x). I have excluded these cases from the appendix
as being effectively mandated by statute.
50. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4)(B).
51. Morley, supra note 36, at 750.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
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3. Court Administration
District judges also work together on non-adjudicatory matters, including
court administration and the adoption of local rules.52 The district courts
manage their administrative business in different ways. Many districts
convene all of their judges at regularly scheduled meetings.53 The Northern
District of Illinois delegates administrative matters to an executive session,54
while others delegate some matters to the chief judge.55 Some district courts
have used their local rules to delegate certain attorney discipline matters to
three-judge panels.56
In short, whether by statutory mandate, local rule, designation to sit on a
court of appeals, or mundane court administration, most, if not all, district
judges will have some experience with collective decision-making. A
separate question is whether the district courts may engage in collective
adjudication when they are not explicitly authorized or directed to do so.
B. Questions of Authority and Stare Decisis
All levels of the federal judiciary have assumed that district courts may
choose to decide cases collectively, even when not required. The Supreme
Court has acknowledged district court en bancs in cases like Hickman v.
Taylor57 and Zadvydas v. Davis,58 and some courts of appeals have praised
them.59 Statutory three-judge courts have also invoked the inherent authority
52. See infra Part III.B.3.
53. See, e.g., N.D. ILL. IOP1(a) (stating that “regular active and senior judges shall
assemble not less than once a month” for official meetings to “establish the policies of the
Court, determine its programs and adopt and promulgate its rules”). Opinions issued by the
Eastern District of Louisiana have referred to the district’s “monthly en banc meeting.” See,
e.g., Adams v. Chater, 914 F. Supp. 1365, 1369 (E.D. La. 1995).
54. See N.D. ILL. IOP2(a) (“This Court shall administer and conduct its business by action
of its Executive Committee.”); see also N.D. ILL. IOP2(b) (describing the composition of the
Executive Committee).
55. See E.D. MICH. LR 83.3 (“When authorized by the Court, the Chief Judge may issue
administrative orders of general scope which apply to all cases pending in the district and
administrative orders of a more limited nature which apply to smaller groups of cases.”).
56. See, e.g., W.D. MO. LR 83.6(d)(3)(A)(i); S.D. TEX. app. A, R. 5(G). As noted above,
I have not included decisions issued by such three-judge disciplinary panels in the appendix.
But I would still characterize collective decisions required by local rules to be “voluntary” on
the part of the district courts, even if not ad hoc; further, disciplinary decisions do constitute
“adjudication.” See, e.g., In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 484–85 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that
attorney discipline and disbarment is an Article III case or controversy and thus constitutes a
judicial decision).
57. 329 U.S. 495, 499 (1947) (noting district court was “sitting en banc”).
58. 533 U.S. 678, 686 (2001) (noting that district court convened as a “panel of five
judges”); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 n.2 (1989) (noting collective
decision of district court); id. at 370 n.5 (noting argument before the district court “was
presented to a panel of sentencing judges”).
59. See Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1182 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting en banc
procedure and complimenting the district court’s “impressive and convincing Opinion and
Order”); United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 1982) (“We . . .
commend the judges of the Southern District for the innovative manner in which they handled
this massive case.”); see also, e.g., United States v. Ruggiero, 846 F.2d 117, 122 n.4 (2d Cir.
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of district courts to sit en banc.60 But not much effort has been made to justify
the district courts’ authority to choose to decide some cases collectively.
When courts have addressed the authority of district courts to issue
collective decisions, they have pointed to past practice and to 28 U.S.C.
§ 132(c).61 Section 132, which establishes the district courts, provides that:
Except as otherwise provided by law, or rule or order of court, the judicial
power of a district court with respect to any action, suit or proceeding may
be exercised by a single judge, who may preside alone and hold a regular
or special session of court at the same time other sessions are held by other
judges.62

Courts and commentators have read the subsection’s sparse legislative
history, which states that the subsection “merely recognizes established
practice,”63 as acknowledging the prior practice of district court en bancs that
predated the 1948 adoption of § 132(c).64 But on closer inspection, the
“established practice” referenced in the legislative history refers instead to
the ability of judges in a single district to hold concurrent court sessions.65

1988) (documenting and approving of the practice); In re Asbestos Litigation, 829 F.2d 1233,
1236 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that, “[t]o avoid inconsistent rulings, the district court considered
the matter in banc”); In re Disclosure of Testimony Before Grand Jury, 580 F.2d 281, 284
(8th Cir. 1978) (noting the district court heard and decided the case en banc).
60. When three-judge courts have been uncertain about whether they were properly
convened under statutory authority, they have alternatively labeled their decisions as one
issued by the district court sitting en banc. See, e.g., Tape Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Younger,
316 F. Supp. 340, 347 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 230 F. Supp. 398, 410, 410
n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Wilson & Co. v. Freeman, 179 F. Supp. 520, 524 (D. Minn. 1959); Int’l
Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. Ackerman, 82 F. Supp. 65, 93–94, 94 n.59
(D. Haw. 1948), rev’d on other grounds, 187 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1951). Indeed, circuit judges
sitting on three-judge courts have, at times, been formally designated as visiting district judges
to ensure the validity of the resulting district court en banc decision, should a higher court
determine that the statutory three-judge panel was convened in error and thus lacked
jurisdiction. See Tape Indus., 316 F. Supp. at 347; Int’l Longshoremen’s, 82 F. Supp. at 93–
94.
61. See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Vazquez, 759 F. Supp. 1467, 1469 (E.D. Cal. 1991); United
States v. Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 289, 293 (S.D. Fla. 1980); see also Bartels, supra note 15, at
40, 41 n.10.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 132(c).
63. Id. § 132(c) note.
64. See Anaya, 509 F. Supp. at 294; see also Ainsworth, 759 F. Supp. at 1469 n.2 (citing
Anaya, 509 F. Supp. at 293–94); Ruggiero, 846 F.2d at 122 n.4; Bartels, supra note 15, at 40,
41 n.10.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 132(c) was “derived from” 48 U.S.C. § 641, “which applied only to the
Territory of Hawaii.” 28 U.S.C. § 132(c) note (“Subsection (c) is derived from section 641 of
title 48, U.S.C., 1940 ed., which applied only to the Territory of Hawaii. The revised section,
by extending it to all districts, merely recognizes established practice.”). 48 U.S.C. § 641
(1946), in turn, corrected a prior statutory anomaly that permitted only one judge at a time to
hold court in Hawaii. Compare 60 Stat. 838 (1909) (providing that the district court in Hawaii
would have two judges but that “[t]he said court while in session shall be presided over by
only one of said judges”), with 68 Stat. 890 (1925) (“The two judges [of the District of Hawaii]
may each hold separately and at the same time a session of the court[.]”); see also H.R. REP.
NO. 68-595, at 1 (1924) (“This bill is to permit the judges of the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii to hold sessions of the court contemporaneously.”). In other words,
after Congress allowed judges in the District of Hawaii to sit concurrently, it made explicit
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Even if the legislative history is unilluminating, however, § 132(c) is
written permissively—it provides that a district court’s judicial power “may”
be exercised by a single judge who “may” preside alone, not that it must be.66
Historically, that matches the common-law practice of the English courts.67
Procedurally, that matches the flexibility Congress granted the district courts
in 28 U.S.C. § 137(a) to divide their judicial business as they see fit.68 One
could read these provisions—§ 132(c) and § 137(a)—as affirmatively
permitting district court en bancs. But, at the very least, Congress has not
prohibited the practice despite more than a century of its intermittent use.
That lack of prohibition is significant because it leaves space for district
courts to exercise, in the words of the Supreme Court, their “inherent
authority to manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the
efficient and expedient resolution of cases.”69 A court’s inherent authority
is the power it possesses “simply because it is a court”70: the power to control
the courtroom and give force to its orders. The Supreme Court has
recognized the federal courts’ inherent powers to manage bar admission and
discipline, punish litigants for contempt, vacate judgments obtained through
fraud on the court, bar criminal defendants who disrupt trial, dismiss cases
sua sponte for failure to prosecute, impose sanctions,71 and (albeit in the
context of the appellate courts) to sit en banc.72
Because such powers are “inherent,” there is no need for an express grant
of authority to exercise them.73 At the same time, because the lower federal
courts are created by Congress, Congress can limit the exercise of their
inherent power by statute or rule.74 There is some disagreement about
whether there is a core set of inherent powers that Congress cannot override
because the powers are essential to the exercise of the courts’ Article III
that district courts generally may hold multiple concurrent sessions—a clarification that
“merely recognize[d] established practice” in the other district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 132(c) note.
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 132(c).
67. See supra Section I.A.1.
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 137(a) (“The business of a court having more than one judge shall be
divided among the judges as provided by the rules and orders of the court. The chief judge of
the district court shall be responsible for the observance of such rules and orders, and shall
divide the business and assign the cases so far as such rules and orders do not otherwise
prescribe.”).
69. Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 47 (2016). On the invocation of inherent power
specifically in the context of case management, see generally Jeffrey C. Dobbins, The Inherent
and Supervisory Power, 54 GA. L. REV. 411 (2020); Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial
Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1805 (1995).
70. Meador, supra note 69, at 1805.
71. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43–46 (1991).
72. See W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 260 (1953) (describing the
authority of appellate courts to sit en banc as “a necessary and useful power”). See generally
Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Comm’r, 314 U.S. 326 (1941) (approving of appellate en bancs in
the absence of a congressional statute or federal rule).
73. See Meador, supra note 69, at 1805. But see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent
Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 847–49
(2001) (distinguishing “implied indispensable powers” from “beneficial powers” and arguing
that the latter—which would include en bancs—should be explicitly authorized by Congress).
74. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 47.
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judicial power.75 But the ability to sit en banc is not in that category of
essential powers: whether a district court decision is issued by one judge or
by many, after all, does not affect its ability to issue any decision. Congress
could thus prohibit district court en bancs if it wished.76
In light of this conceptual framework, the flexible language of § 132(c)
and § 137(a) leaves ample space for district courts to design and elect
procedures for deciding cases collectively. Still, that authority is not
limitless. The district court must “exercise caution in invoking its inherent
power, and it must comply with the mandates of due process.”77 Or, as the
Supreme Court summarized recently: “Because the exercise of an inherent
power in the interest of promoting efficiency may risk undermining other
vital interests related to the fair administration of justice, a district court’s
inherent powers must be exercised with restraint.”78
I will return to these admittedly minimal constraints in Part IV. But one
aspect of the required restraint in the exercise of inherent authority warrants
preliminary consideration: the precedential weight afforded to a district
75. Compare Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 45 (2016) (suggesting that an inherent power
cannot be contrary to “any express grant of or limitation on the district court’s power contained
in a rule or statute”), with Chambers, 501 U.S. at 58 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that
“[s]ome elements of that inherent authority are so essential to ‘[t]he judicial Power,’ U.S.
Const., Art. III, § 1, that they are indefeasible” (second alteration in original)), and Eash v.
Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 562–63 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (distinguishing
“irreducible inherent authority” that cannot be overridden by Congress from “necessary”
inherent authority that can be regulated but not abrogated and “useful” inherent authority that
may be exercised “only in the absence of contrary legislative direction”). Academics
generally agree that there may be a core of indefeasible inherent authority but that it would be
very limited. See Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 816
(2008) (“[T]here is likely some small core of inherent procedural authority that Congress
cannot reach.”); Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress,
79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1686 (2004) (“[T]he federal courts have very little inherent
judicial power in the strong sense—power that prevails as against a conflicting legislative
prescription,” but “[t]he federal courts do have substantial inherent power in the weak sense—
power . . . in the absence of congressional authorization”).
76. Cf. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 314 U.S. at 333–35 (1941) (approving of appellate court
en bancs in the absence of explicit statutory authority but noting that Congress could foreclose
the practice through a clear prohibition). Even so, the Supreme Court has stressed that it will
not lightly assume that Congress intends to displace the lower courts’ inherent powers.
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 47 (citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982)).
Even if a rule or statute speaks to a particular power, such as the power to issue sanctions, the
courts may still invoke their inherent authority to fill in the interstices. See id. at 50 (approving
sanctions beyond those authorized by federal rules or statutes); see also Link v. Wabash R.R.
Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634–36 (1962) (approving sua sponte dismissal for lack of prosecution,
even though the rule only specified dismissal based on a party’s motion). As Professor Samuel
Jordan has pointed out, that acceptance of interstitial power leaves almost limitless space for
the invocation of inherent authority, given that courts seem “resistan[t] to finding a conflict
between a formal rule and inherent power.” Samuel P. Jordan, Situating Inherent Power
Within a Rules Regime, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 311, 321–22 (2010) (expressing concern that the
resulting “clear statement regime” leaves “a role for inherent power that is both unpredictable
and excessively broad”).
77. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50. For recent arguments that the courts’ use of inherent
powers should be restrained, particularly in light of formal procedural alternatives, see
Dobbins, supra note 69; Jordan, supra note 76.
78. Dietz, 579 U.S. at 48.
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court’s collective decision. The modern view is that district court decisions
do not have any stare decisis effect beyond the law-of-the-case doctrine.79 It
would thus be a significant—and problematic—assertion of inherent power
for a district court to declare that a decision is binding in future cases because
it was issued by multiple judges instead of just one. Put another way, every
decision issued by a district judge is an opinion of the district court; how
many judges participated in its formulation does not alter the power of the
institution for which they speak. Voluntary collective district court
adjudication should thus carry no more precedential weight than an
individual district court opinion, which is to say, it should carry none.80
There are some early examples of collective district court decisions,
however, in which judges seemed to assume that the decision had binding
effect.81 It might be that these judges misunderstood the precedential force
of en banc decisions, or it might be that they were applying a particularly
strong form of intra-court comity.82 It is also possible that the modern
position that district court decisions have no stare decisis effect evolved over
the first half of the twentieth century.83 Regardless, the better understanding

79. See, e.g., GARNER ET AL., supra note 15, at 441 (describing law-of-the-case doctrine);
id. at 255 (“[T]rial courts aren’t bound at all by other trial-court decisions, or even their own
decisions, though trial judges may follow them at their discretion.”); id. at 515 (“The stare
decisis effect of federal district-court decisions on other trial courts is nil.”); see also Camreta
v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011) (noting in dicta that district courts are not bound by
district court precedent).
80. Judge Bartels similarly reasoned that because district court decisions are not binding,
en banc decisions cannot have broad stare decisis effect, but he also suggested that the en banc
decision would bind all judges participating in the decision, even if they dissented. Bartels,
supra note 15, at 42; see also GARNER ET AL., supra note 15, at 515 (suggesting in passing
that, “in those rare instances when the judges of a federal district court sit en banc, the resulting
opinion presumably does bind those judges, even dissenters”). The better view is that the
decision creates law-of-the-case for the case decided and encourages the participating judges
to commit to similar outcomes in future cases.
81. For example, Judge Oliver Booth Dickinson specially concurred in In re Clover
Drugs, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Pa. 1937), “solely on the ground that I think we are bound
to follow the ruling of this court” in In re Stein, 17 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. Pa. 1936), a prior “in
banc” decision in which Judge Dickinson had dissented. See In re Clover Drugs, Inc., 21 F.
Supp. at 109 (Dickinson, J., concurring); see also Mayer v. Marcus Mayer Co., 25 F. Supp.
58, 61 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (“The ruling made in [In re Stein] is authoritative and controls this
Court, whatever may be the individual opinion of the sitting Judge.”). For other potential
examples, see United States v. Ortega Lopez, 684 F. Supp. 1506, 1515 (C.D. Cal. 1988)
(asserting that “[t]his decision is binding upon the members of this Court in all relevant
cases”), abrogated by United States v. Brady, 895 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1990); Travelers Ins. Co.
v. Cook, 172 F. Supp. 710, 711 (N.D. Tex. 1959) (asserting that the decision, joined by the
district’s other judges, “is governed by our opinion” in National Surety Corp. v. Chamberlain,
171 F. Supp. 591 (N.D. Tex. 1959), which had also been adopted by the full court as “an en
banc opinion,” id. at 600). The Third Circuit has similarly asserted that “[e]very district court
has the power to review in banc a decision rendered by one of its individual members and
upon such reconsideration by the full bench to overrule the prior decision of the single judge,”
but the cases it cited did not involve reconsideration of prior decisions. TCF Film Corp. v.
Gourley, 240 F.2d 711, 714, 714 n.6 (3d Cir. 1957) (citing In re Stein, as well as the Smith
habeas cases discussed in Part II.B, below).
82. For further discussion of intra-court comity, see infra Part III.B.1.
83. See Mead, supra note 15, at 800–02.
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today is that collective decisions by district courts, like all other district court
decisions, are not precedential.
Even without binding effect, however, district court en bancs can exert
significant limiting effects on future cases. Collective decisions serve as a
precommitment device, in that they make it more costly (both internally and
externally) for judges to issue conflicting decisions later. Even without the
professional pressure to toe the line, the very process of deliberation with
fellow judges can produce opinion convergence,84 such that subsequent cases
within the district may become more consistent without a conscious effort at
compliance. And sometimes judges and litigants will benefit just from the
existence of coordination, which will likewise promote continued adherence.
In sum, district courts have the authority to convene en banc proceedings,
and even though the resulting decisions do not have stare decisis effect, they
can exert influence beyond the case decided. They should thus be undertaken
cautiously, with regard for due process and accountability concerns. The
Article returns to such prescriptive considerations in Part IV, after surveying
and evaluating the historical practice of voluntary collective adjudication in
district courts.
C. Identifying District Court En Bancs
Having distinguished other forms of collective decision-making and
having established the authority of district courts to convene en banc, we can
now turn to a finer-grained definition of the Article’s focus: voluntary
collective district court adjudication. This section describes procedural
variations in voluntary collective adjudication, notes some exclusions to the
definition, and describes the methodology used to identify examples.
1. Forms of Voluntary Collective Adjudication
A challenge in studying the use of en banc proceedings by district courts
is that the courts have used the “en banc” label flexibly, encompassing a
broad range of procedural practices. Another challenge is that the lack of
written rules has led to a high degree of variability in the precise procedures
used. The Article thus uses a broad definition of voluntary collective district
court adjudication to sweep in all possible examples of district court en bancs.
All the decisions listed in the appendix involve—as far as can be determined
from the opinion or its procedural history—multiple district judges
voluntarily choosing to collectively adjudicate a dispute. Note that the issues
addressed in these decisions are typically discrete legal questions, although
they may involve significant evidentiary hearings. Among the gathered
84. See generally Shari Seidman Diamond & Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study
of Sentence Disparity and Its Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 109 (1975) (documenting a modest
reduction in sentencing disparities when district judges gathered to discuss specific cases
before sentencing); Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S.
Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 299, 324–26 (2004) (interpreting findings that composition of appellate panels affects
outcomes as indicating that judges alter voting preferences based on group participation).
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cases, relevant points of distinction include whether the initially assigned
judge retains control of the case, the number of judges involved, and the
degree of deliberation among those judges.
Full en banc decisions are those that represent the considered views of all
or almost all of the district’s judges, typically following a full bench
hearing.85 These proceedings look much like their appellate counterparts.
Full en banc decisions comprise the majority of the cases included in the
appendix.
Panel decisions, which have been relatively rare, involve an ad hoc panel
of judges resolving a dispute on behalf of the court as a whole.86 For a period
in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, the chief judge of the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania would reassign cases to three- or four-judge panels with the
goal of promoting uniform district practice.87 In other districts, the full court
has collectively decided to delegate its authority to a panel of judges for
specific cases.88 And sometimes, one or two judges are asked to assist the
originally assigned judge with a particularly high profile or difficult case.89
The uniting feature of these panel decisions is that judges who were not
initially assigned to a case are asked to assist on behalf of the district court
as a whole.
Coordinated decisions involve judges jointly determining overlapping
issues in cases over which they otherwise retain separate control. Typically,
the coordinating judges share briefing on the overlapping issue and hear
argument together.90 This category also includes cases involving judges
85. There are idiosyncratic reasons why one or more judges might be absent from a full
en banc decision, from illness to scheduling conflict. Other times, the “missing” judges have
been recused or are assigned to multiple districts. See, e.g., In re Starr, 986 F. Supp. 1159
(E.D. Ark. 1997) (noting recusals). And sometimes, a dispute will be of a particularly local
nature, such that only the judges of one division will participate. See generally United States
v. Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d 304 (E.D. Va. 1999) (involving all the judges of the Richmond
division addressing a law enforcement program in the city of Richmond). Because the intent
of these decisions is still to speak for the court as a whole, I would categorize them as full en
bancs.
86. One reason this form of collective decision-making is rare is because it requires a
district to have a sizeable number of judges. For many of the examples in the appendix,
especially before 1970, there simply were not enough judges in any given district to justify
delegation to a panel. See Appendix (listing number of judgeships per district).
87. See, e.g., Lovallo v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 99 F.R.D. 627, 627 (E.D. Pa. 1983);
Kohr v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1070, 1072 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Lucas v.
“Brinknes” Schiffahrts Ges. Franz Lange G.m.B.H. & Co., 379 F. Supp. 759, 760 n.*
(E.D. Pa. 1974).
88. See generally In re Smith, 100 F. Supp. 2d 412 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (delegating a
question of reciprocal attorney discipline to a three-judge panel).
89. See, e.g., Ellis v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 234 F. Supp. 945, 946 (D. Md. 1964)
(given that “the case involved a question of great local interest, . . . additional judges of this
Court were invited to hear and to participate in its decision”), aff’d, 352 F.2d 123, 124 n.1
(4th Cir. 1965) (noting in affirming district court decision that “[b]ecause of the importance
of the case the District Judge to whom it was assigned invited two of his colleagues on the
court to sit with him,” even though “[a] statutory three-judge court was not required”).
90. See, e.g., Movement Against Destruction v. Volpe, 361 F. Supp. 1360, 1367 (D. Md.
1973) (noting that the two authoring judges consolidated the cases “for the sole purpose of the
hearing and decision of the class issues”), aff’d, 500 F.2d 29, 30 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam)
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from multiple districts because judges cannot cede or share authority across
district lines. The federal judges in Alabama, for example, coordinated
across the three federal districts in Alabama in 1963 to enjoin George
Wallace and others from continuing to violate desegregation orders91 and
again in 1971 in deciding to dismiss similar environmental lawsuits filed by
the same plaintiff in all three districts.92
Adopted decisions are those in which one judge hears argument and
authors an opinion but notes that other judges join in adopting the resulting
decision.93 These decisions reflect agreement among the judges as to how a
legal question should be addressed but not necessarily on the specifics of the
particular case.94 They thus differ from full en banc decisions in that they
are primarily the work product of a single judge and typically involve less
deliberation in the crafting of the opinion.
The lines between these four categories can be blurry, a problem
compounded by the lack of information in most of these opinions regarding
the procedure used. Nonetheless, the procedural distinctions across these
four subtypes provides a useful contrast for evaluating when collective
adjudication is beneficial and how it should be carried out going forward.
2. Exclusions
While my definition of voluntary collective district court adjudication is
broad, it still does not include every example of voluntary collective
adjudication at the trial court level. For example, I have excluded all cases
before 1912 in order to ensure I have not accidentally included decisions
issued by the old circuit courts. I have also omitted examples of collective
(praising efforts of the two judges while noting the cases remained on the court calendar for
separate adjudication).
91. See generally United States v. Wallace, 222 F. Supp. 485 (M.D. Ala. 1963).
92. See Bass Angler Sportsman Soc’y v. U.S. Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412, 414 (S.D.
Ala. 1971), aff’d sub nom, Bass Anglers Sportsman Soc’y of Am. v. Koppers Co., 447 F.2d
1304 (5th Cir. 1971). For other examples of cross-district decisions, see In re Constitutionality
of Frazier-Lemke Act, 9 F. Supp. 575, 575 (E.D. Ark. 1934); Birmingham Tr. & Sav. Co. v.
Atlanta, B. & A. Ry. Co., 271 F. 743 (N.D. Ga. 1921); Hannah & Hogg v. Clyne, 263 F. 599
(N.D. Ill. 1919). The Birmingham Trust case involved a bankruptcy receivership that stretched
across multiple federal districts. See A.B. & A. May Be Sold to Frisco, MACON DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Feb. 27, 1921, at 1, 4; Sibley Rejects Union Petition, MACON DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Mar. 25, 1921, at 1, 9. In Hannah & Hogg, the plaintiff (a major distiller) filed similar cases
in both the northern and southern districts challenging Prohibition on due process grounds.
See May Lift Dry Ban Here: Judges to Fix Liquor’s Fate by Saturday, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Nov.
13, 1919, at 1–2.
93. See, e.g., Slomberg v. Pennabaker, 42 F.R.D. 8, 12 (M.D. Pa. 1967) (noting that,
“[a]fter conference, the judges of the district are in agreement with the views expressed
herein”). See generally Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp. 476 (D.N.J. 1962).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Brittman, 687 F. Supp. 1329, 1331 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (noting
most of the other judges agree with the holding, “although they may not individually agree
with the undersigned as to all of the different grounds set forth in the following opinion”),
rev’d, 872 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1989); see also Telephone Interview with U.S. District Judge
(June 18, 2020) (distinguishing between adopted decisions involving “back and forth”
discussion and editing and decisions in which judges simply agreed on a conclusion of law
without necessarily agreeing as to its application in the particular case).

2022]

DISTRICT COURT EN BANCS

1559

decision-making by non–Article III judges, including territorial courts,
agency adjudicators,95 magistrate judges,96 and bankruptcy judges.97 And
even among Article III judges, I have focused just on the geographic districts,
even though the Court of International Trade and the U.S. Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court98 (FISC) are statutorily authorized (but not
necessarily required to) hear some cases en banc or as panels.99 Further,
because I am interested in collective decision-making among district judges,
I have excluded examples of individual federal district judges coordinating
with state court judges in managing complex litigation.100
I have also excluded some cases that others have categorized as examples
of district court en bancs, either because there is no available opinion101 or

95. Cf. Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action,
126 YALE L.J. 1634 (2017) (discussing ad hoc procedure used by agencies to aggregate
claims).
96. See In re U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose
Records of the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 616 (W.D. Pa. 2008), aff’d, No. 07-524M, 2008
WL 4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008), and vacated sub nom. 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010)
(collectively deciding on “a matter of first impression in this District and Circuit on issues
concerning the statutory and Constitutional regulation of electronic surveillance which do not
hinge on the particulars of the underlying investigation”).
97. There are numerous examples of bankruptcy judges choosing to decide cases
collectively. See, e.g., In re Scott, 424 B.R. 315, 320 n.3 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010) (“The Court
derives its authority to issue this [collective] opinion from 28 U.S.C. § 132(c) . . . .”); In re
Hunter, 380 B.R. 753, 758 n.5 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008) (invoking 28 U.S.C. § 132(c) as
authorizing bankruptcy court to consolidate cases and convene a three-judge panel to hear
arguments on related issues); In re Iron-Oak Supply Corp., 162 B.R. 301, 304–05 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. 1993) (discussing authority to do so and collecting additional examples); see also U.S.
BANKR. CT. W.D. OKLA. R. 7052-1 (“Upon request of a judge of the Court, or upon motion,
any matter may be heard en banc if all judges of the Court concur.”).
98. The U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court was established by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 and 50 U.S.C.).
99. See 28 U.S.C. § 255(a) (“Upon application of any party to a civil action, or upon his
own initiative, the chief judge of the Court of International Trade shall designate any three
judges of the court to hear and determine any civil action which the chief judge finds:
(1) raises an issue of the constitutionality of an Act of Congress, a proclamation of the
President or an Executive order; or (2) has broad or significant implications in the
administration or interpretation of the customs laws.”); 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2) (authorizing
the FISC to hold “a hearing or rehearing, en banc” when a majority of the court’s judges
determine that “en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the
court’s decisions” or “the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance”). These
FISC en banc proceedings are separate from and preliminary to the court of review also
established by the FISA. See id. § 1803(b). I am grateful to Steve Vladeck for bringing FISC
en bancs to my attention.
100. See generally William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in Action:
Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689 (1992)
(documenting the phenomenon). I have, however, included a few cases that involved
coordination with state court judges, as well as other district judges—in particular, cases
involving Judge Jack B. Weinstein in the Eastern District of New York, district judges from
the Southern District of New York, and New York state court judges. See generally In re
Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Joint E. & S.
Dists. Asbestos Litig., 142 F.R.D. 60 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1992).
101. Judge Bartels, for example, included nine en banc panels that did not result in a written
opinion. Bartels, supra note 15, at 40.
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because the opinion did not adjudicate a dispute.102 Finally, I have excluded
decisions by mandatory three-judge courts in which the judges, concerned
that their statutory authority might not have been properly invoked, have
alternatively characterized their decision as that of an en banc district
court.103
3. Methodology
Prior acknowledgments of district court en bancs collectively identified
fewer than fifty examples (some of which I have excluded for the reasons
explained above).104 To find additional examples, I leveraged field and
segment restrictions within Westlaw and Lexis. In particular, I searched the
“Panel” (PA) field within Westlaw’s district court database for the word
“judges,” which returned cases that stated the case was “before” multiple
judges; by excluding “circuit” from the PA field, I was able to exclude almost
all statutorily mandated three-judge courts.105 Lexis uses a “judges” segment
that can be searched similarly.106 Other searches, which yielded fewer
positive results, are noted in the margin.107
Although I was able to identify nearly one hundred additional examples
through such searches, these results are assuredly underinclusive. Field
coding within the databases is inconsistent and imperfect. Such searches are
also unlikely to identify collective decisions that are unpublished: not only
are unpublished decisions typically not coded, but the online databases do
not include most unpublished decisions prior to the 1990s.108 Further, given
my primary reliance on the PA field to locate additional examples, I expect
that my results significantly undercount adopted decisions, which typically
102. For an example of such a non-adjudicatory decision, see General Order on Judicial
Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported
Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
103. See supra note 60 (collecting cases). I have, however, included a decision in which
two district judges from a statutory three-judge panel voluntarily continued to work together
to resolve follow-on litigation. See Arthur v. Schoonfield, 315 F. Supp. 548, 549, 552 n.3
(D. Md. 1970).
104. See Bartels, supra note 15, at 40 (noting forty-seven en banc panels, of which I have
excluded at least ten); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 15, § 3505 nn.10–12 (noting twelve
examples that largely overlap with Bartels’s list).
105. The precise search was “PA(judges % circuit).” I also searched “PA(“en banc”)” and
variants thereof.
106. A research assistant searched “judges(“Judges” and not “Circuit Judge” and not
“Circuit Judges” and not “Court of Appeal” and not “Court of Appeals” and not “Magistrate”),
with some additional restrictions, and identified some additional cases not discovered through
the Westlaw search.
107. Additional searches within Westlaw included SY(“en banc” “in banc”); SY,DI(“en
banc” /5 district); and PR(“per curium” “en banc” (panel /s district)). The DIS and CON fields
(for dissents and concurrences) proved to be too erratically coded within the district court
database to be helpful.
108. District court en bancs are likely to be published, given the amount of effort put into
them. Nonetheless, I have found a few unpublished collective decisions. See In re Engle
Cases, No. 309-cv-10000, 2014 WL 7010031 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2014); In re All Asbestos
Cases Pending in the U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Md., No. BML-1, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10719 (D. Md. Dec. 16, 1983).

2022]

DISTRICT COURT EN BANCS

1561

appear under the name of a single judge but indicate the support of additional
judges within the text of the opinion itself.109 Thus, while the results are
sufficient to establish the continuity and breadth of the phenomenon of
district court en bancs, they cannot support strong inferences regarding the
distribution of collective proceedings, such as the relative frequency of
collective proceedings during different time periods or the absence of
collective proceedings in particular districts.
An additional caveat is in order. Almost every example of a district court
en banc discussed below would warrant its own historical account. I have
supplemented, where possible, with district court histories, concurrent news
coverage, and (for more recent cases) district judge interviews. But I have
based my inclusion of cases primarily on the decisions themselves, which
leaves open the possibility that local rules or other requirements were
operating in the background. Some gaps in the understanding of individual
trees, however, should not undermine the picture presented by the entire
forest.
II. A CENTURY OF DISTRICT COURT EN BANCS
“The history of the federal courts is woven into the history of the times.”110
This part draws out the connection between district court en bancs and
moments of pressure and change for the federal courts. The coverage here is
purposefully selective; additional cases are discussed in the functional
account of Part III, and a full list of cases is included in the appendix.
A. Growing Courts, Growing Dockets (1912–1940)
When the old circuit courts were abolished in 1912, the federal judiciary
was still quite small. As of 1903, only the Southern District of New York
and the District of Minnesota had two judges; in other states, one judge would
be assigned to multiple districts.111 Visiting judgeships were used to fill
critical gaps.112 To the extent that judges are likely to follow their own
decisions, then, there was a de facto “law of the district” at the time our story
begins. But a surge in district court workload created first by Prohibition
prosecutions and then by bankruptcy cases led Congress to expand
significantly the number of district judges from 140 in 1920 to 250 by
109. See, e.g., Hamby v. Zayre Corp., 544 F. Supp. 176, 179 (N.D. Ala. 1982) (noting that
“[t]he undersigned hereby note our concurrence in the foregoing opinion”); Pedicord v.
Swenson, 304 F. Supp. 393, 401 (W.D. Mo. 1969) (noting that “this Memorandum Opinion
and Order was circulated among all the active judges of this Court for their views and
suggestions” and that the judges “have authorized [the authoring judge] to state their
concurrence with the standards and principles of law stated”).
110. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 16, at 59.
111. See ERWIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 394–98 (2d ed. 2002).
112. See id. at 409. This created an occasional need for the visiting judge to coordinate
with the local judge. For example, in Dill v. Supreme Lodge, 226 F. 807 (E.D. Mo. 1915), a
visiting judge issued a bankruptcy order that would require further judicial supervision;
perhaps because of this practical need, the opinion concluded by noting the local judge’s
explicit approval of the decision. See generally id.
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1940.113 Perhaps district court en bancs during this period reflected an effort
to maintain district-level stare decisis as districts grew from one to two or
more judgeships.114
It is also notable, however, that most of the district court en bancs from
this period pertained to bankruptcy or criminal matters, the two topics
dominating the district court dockets at the time, as well as the public’s
attention. The Volstead Act of 1919,115 which empowered the federal
government to enforce Prohibition,116 significantly increased the federal
criminal docket; by 1929, “83 percent of federal criminal proceedings
involved Volstead Act violations,” which numbered 71,298 cases that year
alone.117 Some district courts used en bancs to address a range of novel
criminal procedure questions.118 By the time Prohibition ended in 1933, the
number of bankruptcy petitions had already exploded. During the 1930s, the
federal courts discharged or concluded on average about 60,000 bankruptcy
petitions per year.119 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania repeatedly used
en banc decisions for bankruptcy cases that implicated uniformity or were of
particular public importance.120 For example, the court issued two “full
bench” opinions regarding the bankruptcy of the Philadelphia Rapid Transit
Company, which involved somewhere between $30 million and $87 million
worth of claims.121
113. See HOFFER ET AL., supra note 36, at 259–63, 284–85.
114. For information about the tenure of individual judges and the number of judgeships
assigned to specific districts over time, see the Federal Judicial Center’s highly informative
online database. See Courts, Caseloads, and Jurisdiction, FED. JUD. CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-district-courts-and-federal-judiciary
[https://perma.cc/YU9Y-Y35W] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
115. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919).
116. See id.
117. HOFFER ET AL., supra note 36, at 259.
118. See generally United States v. Delaney, 8 F. Supp. 224 (D.N.J. 1934) (addressing bail
pending appeal); United States v. Wingert, 55 F.2d 960 (E.D. Pa. 1932) (weighing district
judges’ power to decline to issue bench warrants after grand jury indictments); United States
v. Reilly, 30 F.2d 866 (E.D. Pa. 1929) (considering grounds for quashing of indictment);
United States v. Napela, 28 F.2d 898 (N.D.N.Y. 1928) (reviewing search warrants in Volstead
Act prosecution); United States v. Am. Brewing Co., 296 F. 772 (E.D. Pa. 1924) (same);
United States v. Innelli, 286 F. 731 (E.D. Pa. 1923) (same); see also United States v.
Grossman, 1 F.2d 941 (N.D. Ill. 1924) (rejecting presidential pardon for civil contempt in
Volstead Act case). Beyond the criminal context, the judges of the Northern and Southern
Districts of Illinois coordinated their resolution of due process challenges to Prohibition
brought in parallel high-profile suits. See Hannah & Hogg v. Clyne, 263 F. 599 (N.D. Ill.
1919); May Lift Dry Ban Here: Judges to Fix Liquor’s Fate by Saturday, supra note 92, at
1–2.
119. HOFFER ET AL., supra note 36, at 285.
120. See In re Jay & Dee Store Co., 37 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Pa. 1941); In re Clover Drugs,
Inc., 21 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Pa. 1937); In re Collins Hosiery Mills, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 89 (E.D.
Pa. 1937); In re Stein, 17 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. Pa. 1936). For a bankruptcy example from
another district, see In re Anderson, 22 F. Supp. 928, 929 (D.N.D. 1938) (visiting judges from
the District of Minnesota noting that a similar question had been raised in more than 130
bankruptcy petitions).
121. See In re Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 11 F. Supp. 865, 866 (E.D. Pa. 1935); In re Phila.
Rapid Transit Co., 8 F. Supp. 51, 52 (E.D. Pa. 1934) (“The instant case . . . affects interests of
such importance that it was directed to be submitted to the full bench rather than to a single
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Other district judges sat together during the 1930s to hear cases
challenging the constitutionality of U.S. statutes, particularly Congress’s
bankruptcy legislation.122 Those decisions were part of the broader trend of
federal courts blocking New Deal legislation that led Congress in 1937 to
extend three-judge court requirements to suits seeking to enjoin federal
statutes as unconstitutional.123
B. Judicial Authority Amidst “Our Federalism” (1940–1970)
After the war, district courts used en bancs to police jurisdictional limits
between states and the federal government and between the courts and
Congress, particularly in regard to high salience issues like labor unrest and
race relations.124 To take just one example, the Northern District of
California issued a collective decision dismissing for incomplete diversity a
complaint challenging segregation and discrimination within a labor
union.125 The broader social stakes of the case, however, were not lost on
the judges, one of whom wrote separately to stress that jurisdictional limits
on federal courts were paramount “[n]o matter how great the appeal of an
issue to the conscience of the Court.”126 The controversial Portal-to-Portal
Act of 1947127 also generated district court en bancs.128 In a decision
judge”), aff’d, Wilson v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 73 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir. 1934) (per curiam).
Notably, Judge George A. Welsh dissented in both decisions even though it appears he was
the assigned judge and had initiated the en banc proceeding. In re Phila. Rapid Transit Co.,
8 F. Supp. at 55 (Welsh, J., dissenting) (“But I wish to thank them for their assistance and
cooperation in a case of such magnitude. I felt that the cause was of such a nature that instead
of being passed upon by a single judge, it warranted the attention and consideration of the
entire court.”). This pattern was to repeat itself in the Smith habeas cases, discussed below in
Part II.B.
122. See In re Schoenleber, 13 F. Supp. 375 (D. Neb. 1936) (finding farm bankruptcy
statute unconstitutional); In re Young, 12 F. Supp. 30 (S.D. Ill. 1935) (same); Gold Medal
Foods, Inc. v. Landy, 11 F. Supp. 65 (D. Minn. 1935) (enjoining collection of federal taxes);
In re Constitutionality of Frazier-Lemke Act, 9 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Ark. 1934) (demonstrating
agreement between sole judges of Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas that farm
bankruptcy statute was constitutional).
123. See supra Part I.A.2.
124. See, e.g., Linde Air Prods. Co. v. Johnson, 77 F. Supp. 656, 659 (D. Minn. 1948)
(enjoining state labor board from intervening in a unionization dispute); Yoerg Brewing Co.
v. Brennan, 59 F. Supp. 625, 633 (D. Minn. 1945) (invoking Norris-LaGuardia Act in refusing
to enjoin strike related to inter-union dispute). For examples involving labor unrest in the
interwar period, see The Wind, 22 F. Supp. 883, 885 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (declining to intervene
in an inter-union dispute involving Norwegian ship in light of treaty with Norway);
Birmingham Trust & Sav. Co. v. Atlanta, B. & A. Ry. Co., 271 F. 743, 745–46 (N.D. Ga.
1921) (allowing bankruptcy receiver of major regional railroad to reduce wages set by the
National Labor Board and replace striking workers).
125. See James v. Int’l Brotherhood of Boiler Makers, Iron Ship Builders and Helpers of
Am., 54 F. Supp. 94, 94–95 (N.D. Cal. 1944). Complete diversity was lacking because the
union, as an unincorporated association, had the same citizenship as every one of its members.
Id. at 95 (Goodman, J., concurring).
126. Id.
127. Pub. L. No. 80-49, 61 Stat. 84 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
128. The Portal-to-Portal Act walked back the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act that had required compensation for preliminary work activities; it also
purported to strip all courts in the country of jurisdiction over pending cases that had sought
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upholding the Act’s constitutionality, including its jurisdiction-stripping
provision, all five judges of the Eastern District of Michigan emphasized that
the “[p]otential liability under those claims amounted to billions of dollars,
affecting not only the parties directly involved but seemingly threatening the
entire economic and financial fabric of our industrial life and government”—
particularly in Michigan, where automobile manufacturers stood to benefit
from the Act’s legislative fix.129
Another growing point of tension between federal courts and state
governments was the appropriate scope of postconviction review for state
prisoners. Prior to the 1960s, habeas corpus petitions brought by state
prisoners were rare, and their successful prosecution even rarer.130 Yet, as
the Supreme Court began articulating greater constitutional protections for
criminal defendants in light of (often racialized) miscarriages of justice in
state courts, pressure mounted on the federal courts to enforce the
constitutional rights of state prisoners. A turning point came with the Court’s
1953 decision in Brown v. Allen,131 which “clearly ruled that a federal court
should routinely relitigate the merits of federal constitutional issues that the
state court had decided adversely to the state prisoner.”132 A companion case
to Brown v. Allen—United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi133—began as a pair
of contentious en banc decisions in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
James Smith was a 23-year-old Black man with schizophrenia who was
awaiting execution by Pennsylvania for a murder he had admitted to
committing.134 His habeas petition was first raised to Judge Welsh of the
Eastern District by a Friday night telephone call; after an expedited hearing
the next day, Judge Welsh formally announced from the bench that he would
grant the writ and stay the execution pending resolution on the merits.135 He
then asked “[his] brother judges to sit with [him]” to consider those merits at
a subsequent hearing in order “to get the benefit of the collective wisdom of
[his] associates rather than to have the case decided on the opinion of a single
judge.”136 Instead of reaching the merits, however, his four brethren
dismissed the petition because the state had transferred Smith to a different
prison during the course of Judge Welsh’s Saturday hearing, such that Smith
was no longer within the Eastern District at the time Judge Welsh made his

back wages based on the Court’s holdings. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 31, at 326–27. The
Act affected nearly two thousand lawsuits that were seeking more than $5 billion in damages.
Id. at 326.
129. Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 76 F. Supp. 178, 180–81 (E.D. Mich. 1948), aff’d, Fisch
v. Gen. Motors Co., 169 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1948); see also Alameda v. Paraffine Cos., 75 F.
Supp. 282 (N.D. Cal. 1947) (upholding the Act’s constitutionality).
130. See, e.g., John M. Oliver, Postconviction Applications Viewed by Federal Judge—
Revisited, 45 F.R.D. 199, 204, 204 n.4 (1968–1969).
131. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
132. FALLON ET AL., supra note 31, at 1274.
133. 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
134. See United States ex rel. Smith v. Warden of Phila. Cnty. Prison, 87 F. Supp. 339
(E.D. Pa. 1949), aff’d, 181 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1950).
135. See Smith, 87 F. Supp. at 340.
136. Id. at 346.
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formal announcement from the bench.137 The majority was also concerned
that Smith had not yet exhausted his state remedies.138
Smith came back to the district court in 1951, after being denied relief by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.139 Judge Welsh again stayed the execution
and set the case for consideration on the merits before another en banc
court.140 A four-judge majority denied the habeas petition, with Judge Bard
emphasizing the impropriety of “subject[ing] the judicial acts of the highest
state court to review by the lowest federal court in routine cases.”141 Judge
Welsh, joined by two other judges, dissented on the grounds that someone—
either the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or the district court—should have
held an evidentiary hearing on the question of Smith’s mental state.142 The
Third Circuit affirmed Judge Bard’s decision but split 4–3 with a lengthy
dissent;143 the Supreme Court similarly split 6–3 with a dissent written by
Justice Felix Frankfurter.144
Ten years after Brown v. Allen, a trilogy of Supreme Court cases further
increased the scope of collateral review of state criminal cases,145
exponentially increasing the number of state prisoner habeas petitions filed
in federal courts.146 The judges of the Western District of Missouri handled
this increase by issuing an en banc opinion that set out “in some detail . . .
the principles that control the exercise of our federal habeas corpus

137. Id. at 341.
138. Id. Judge Guy K. Bard wrote separately to note that he would have dismissed the writ
regardless because, “[w]ith such a record before them[,] courts also have a duty to protect
society and to refrain from doing anything that [w]ill interfere with the just punishment of a
brutal murderer.” Id. at 344 (Bard, J., concurring). Judge Welsh wrote separately as well;
though his opinion was not labeled a dissent, he disagreed on the jurisdictional question and
also disagreed with Judge Bard on the merits. Id. at 349–51 (“I feel that even to permit a
good-faith removal to set up a geographic bar to jurisdiction would establish a precedent
whereby at some future time a removal not in good faith, but a removal motivated by religious,
racial, class or political hatred could destroy the very living soul of the Writ.”).
139. United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 96 F. Supp. 100 (E.D. Pa.), aff’d, 192 F.2d 540
(3d Cir. 1951), aff’d, 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
140. See id. at 101.
141. Id. at 103.
142. See id. at 105–06 (Welsh, J., Ganey, J., and Clary, J., dissenting).
143. See United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540 (3d Cir. 1951).
144. See United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953). Concurrently, the two
judges of the Middle District of Pennsylvania were collaborating on another difficult habeas
petition. See United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 97 F. Supp. 930 (M.D. Pa. 1951), rev’d,
203 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1953) (per curiam). On remand in that case, Judge John W. Murphy
held a two-week evidentiary hearing before denying the habeas petition again, with Judge
Albert Leisenring Watson noting his agreement at the end of the opinion. United States ex rel.
Darcy v. Handy, 130 F. Supp. 270, 277, 299 (M.D. Pa.), aff’d, 224 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1955),
aff’d, 351 U.S. 454 (1956).
145. See Oliver, supra note 130, at 206 (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963);
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963)).
146. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 31, at 1270 (providing a table of state prisoner habeas
petitions from 1950 to 2013 that documents a significant increase between 1960 and 1965).
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jurisdiction.”147 District courts have continued to use collective proceedings
to address recurrent procedural issues in state prisoner habeas litigation.148
Race remained a uniting theme of district court en bancs through the
1960s. The District of Maryland, for example, used collective proceedings
to address equal protection challenges to the apportionment plan for
Baltimore City Council149 and the district’s jury selection processes,150 as
well as habeas petitions related to the jailing of Black citizens for
nonpayment of court costs and fines.151 The five judges of Alabama’s three
federal districts collectively enjoined Governor George Wallace and his
followers from preventing school boards from complying with desegregation
orders.152
Not all collective district court activity aimed to further civil rights,
however; “[f]or some district judges in the Fifth Circuit, inaction on civil
rights matters and disregard of clear and recent legal authority bordered on
defiance of the law.”153 The Western District of Louisiana used en banc
decisions to push back on the Fifth Circuit’s impatience with ineffective
“freedom of choice” plans for desegregating schools.154 After the Fifth
Circuit drew a more explicit line on appeal,155 the Western District issued
another en banc decision in which it felt “impelled to repeat,” “with all
deference to the Court of Appeals,” that freedom of choice remained the best
solution.156 Nonetheless, it complied with the Fifth Circuit’s mandate and
followed the lead of the District of South Carolina, which had similarly sat
en banc regarding school desegregation cases in 1969,157 in directing that the
local school boards work with the U.S. Department of Housing, Education
147. White v. Swenson, 261 F. Supp. 42, 44 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
148. See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Vazquez, 759 F. Supp. 1467 (E.D. Cal. 1991); Hurst v. Hogan,
435 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
149. See Ellis v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 234 F. Supp. 945, 946 (D. Md. 1964)
(explaining that a three-judge court was not required because the challenge was to a local
ordinance rather than a state statute), aff’d, 352 F.2d 123, 124 n.1 (4th Cir. 1965) (noting the
district court voluntarily convened as a three-member court).
150. See United States v. Cohen, 275 F. Supp. 724, 726–29 (D. Md. 1967), aff’d, United
States v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385 (4th Cir. 1968).
151. See Arthur v. Schoonfield, 315 F. Supp. 548, 549, 552 n.3 (D. Md. 1970).
152. See generally United States v. Wallace, 222 F. Supp. 485 (M.D. Ala. 1963). For more
on the contentious context of the case, see BASS, supra note 3, at 209–11; Brian K. Landsberg,
Enforcing Desegregation: A Case Study of Federal District Court Power and Social Change
in Macon County Alabama, 48 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 867, 877 (2014).
153. JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES: THE DRAMATIC STORY OF THE SOUTHERN JUDGES
WHO TRANSLATED THE SUPREME COURT’S BROWN DECISION INTO A REVOLUTION FOR
EQUALITY 220 (1981).
154. See Conley v. Lake Charles Sch. Bd., 293 F. Supp. 84, 88 (W.D. La. 1968) (noting
that “[w]e have heard these cases ‘en banc’ and rendered this ruling together” and emphasizing
that “[w]ith every ounce of sincerity which we possess we think freedom of choice is the best
plan available”), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Hall v. St. Helena Par. Sch. Bd., 417 F.2d 801
(5th Cir. 1969).
155. See Hall, 417 F.2d at 809 (stating that “[i]t is abundantly clear that freedom of choice,
as presently constituted and operating in the Western District school districts before us, does
not” satisfy the constitutional demand for an integrated school system).
156. See Conley v. Lake Charles Sch. Bd., 303 F. Supp. 394, 396 (W.D. La. 1969).
157. See Whittenberg v. Greenville Cnty. Sch. Dist., 298 F. Supp. 784 (D.S.C. 1969).
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and Welfare to develop new plans.158 The contentiousness of school
desegregation was not limited to the South, either; the protracted litigation in
Detroit, for example, led the chief judge of the Eastern District of Michigan
to appoint a temporary three-judge panel to oversee the implementation of
court orders in Bradley v. Milliken.159
C. Managing Mass Litigation (1970–1990)
By the end of the 1960s, the federal courts were searching for ways to
manage complex litigation. The 1966 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 introduced the modern class action, and judges also
spearheaded the adoption in 1968 of the multidistrict litigation (MDL)
statute.160 The use of district court en bancs similarly shifted at the end of
the 1960s toward addressing mass litigation. An early example involved the
explosion of longshoremen cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
following the Supreme Court’s expansion of available remedies.161 In a pair
of decisions, a four-judge panel appointed by the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania’s chief judge addressed complicated procedural questions
arising in more than 1100 pending longshoremen cases.162 The panel was
emphatic about the crisis these cases represented for the district: “Despite
[the] herculean efforts” of the district’s judges to diminish their backlog of
longshoremen cases, the district still had “the longest median time interval
for termination of trials of any federal court in the nation” at forty-one
months.163 “There is complete unanimity among the Judges of our Court,”
the panel wrote, that Congress must either amend the law or else provide
“additional judges and facilities.”164
158. See Conley, 303 F. Supp. at 397, 398–99.
159. See DAVID GARDNER CHARDAVOYNE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN: PEOPLE, LAW, AND POLITICS 315–16 (2012) (describing a
period of time in which a voluntary three-judge panel managed the case). For an example of
a collective decision in the case, see generally Bradley v. Milliken, 585 F. Supp. 348 (E.D.
Mich. 1984), vacated, 772 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1985). A similar story might lie behind the per
curiam decisions issued by two judges regarding the school desegregation plan for Atlanta.
See Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (per curiam); Calhoun v. Cook, 332
F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (per curiam).
160. For the seminal history of the MDL statute, see generally Andrew D. Bradt,
“A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 831
(2017).
161. See Turner v. Transportacion Maritima Mexicana S.A., 44 F.R.D. 412, 420 (E.D. Pa.
1968) (noting how longshoremen could now sue shipowners directly in admiralty in addition
to remedies available under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s Act).
162. See id.; Close v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 44 F.R.D. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1968), aff’d, Blake v.
Farrell Lines, Inc., 417 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1969). As these opinions note, a similar delegated
panel procedure was also used contemporaneously to resolve a recurrent question of pendent
party jurisdiction. See Turner, 44 F.R.D. at 414 n.1 (referring to Olivieri v. Adams, 280 F.
Supp. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1968)).
163. Turner, 44 F.R.D. at 416.
164. Id. at 420 (emphasis in original). Six more judgeships were added to the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania in 1970. See Pub. L. No. 91-272, 84 Stat. 294 (1970) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 133). Congress also overhauled the Longshoremen’s and Harbor
Worker’s Compensation Act in 1972. See generally Francis J. Gorman, The Longshoremen’s
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By the early 1980s, the crush of asbestos litigation was generating
collective decisions in multiple districts.
The Eastern District of
Pennsylvania again used appointed panels to resolve some recurrent
questions in asbestos cases.165 In the District of Maryland, which
experimented with consolidating asbestos cases and identifying clusters of
cases for trial,166 six of the district’s judges signed an unpublished opinion
rejecting defendants’ objections to the resulting consolidated trial schedule;
given the 424 asbestos cases pending in the district, they emphasized, “these
cases cannot proceed on a business as usual basis.”167 Meanwhile, the
fourteen judges of the District of New Jersey convened a full en banc hearing
to resolve a constitutional law question raised in many pending asbestos
cases, splitting 8–6 against the defendants.168 Because the asbestos cases had
been temporarily consolidated for purposes of resolving this particular
question, the decision declared that the majority’s ruling “shall henceforth be
the law of the case for all cases in the asbestos litigation in the District of
New Jersey.”169
The need to resolve recurrent complex legal issues generated numerous
coordinated decisions during this time period, from environmental
challenges regarding the construction of interstate highways170 to
constitutional challenges of zoning ordinances.171 In 1988 and 1989, at least
& Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act—After the 1972 Amendments, 6 J. MARITIME L. &
COM. 1 (1974) (summarizing changes).
165. See Kohr v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (appointed
panel); Lovallo v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 99 F.R.D. 627 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (appointed panel);
see also Parker v. Bell Asbestos Mines, Ltd., 607 F. Supp. 1397 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (collectively
deciding identical summary judgment issues in cases before three judges).
166. See In re All Asbestos Cases Pending in the U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Md., No.
BML-1, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10719 (D. Md. Dec. 16, 1983).
167. Id. at *2 (“To prevent an even greater backlog of cases and to conserve judi-cial [sic]
resources, the consolidation today being ordered by this Court is not only warranted but
necessary.”). For another use of collective decision-making in the management of asbestos
litigation, see In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Va. 1981) (disqualifying local law
firm from litigation due to conflict of interests).
168. See In re Asbestos Litig., 628 F. Supp. 774 (D.N.J. 1986), aff’d, 829 F.2d 1233
(3d Cir. 1987).
169. Id. at 784. This declaration may have been too sweeping, however, as the decision
could only be law of the case for the cases consolidated, and thus pending, at the time.
170. See Movement Against Destruction v. Volpe, 361 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Md. 1973), aff’d,
500 F.2d 29, 30 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). The judges held a conference with the parties
to fix a schedule, conducted some joint hearings, and “consolidated” the cases “for the sole
purpose of the hearing and decision of the class issues involving the 3-A System as a whole.”
Id. at 1367.
171. See Nortown Theatre Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Mich. 1974), rev’d, Am.
Mini Theaters, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975), rev’d, Young v. Am. Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). For other examples, see Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.
v. One Parcel of Land in Montgomery Cnty., 549 F. Supp. 584, 586 (D. Md. 1982) (resolving
identical legal challenges by landowners arising out of the construction of the D.C. area’s
subway system); United States v. Wright, 516 F. Supp. 1119, 1121 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (hearing
common issues in criminal contempt convictions of thirteen defendants who had obstructed
construction of integrated housing in defiance of court orders); Lopez v. Franklin, 427 F. Supp.
345, 346 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (jointly considering the constitutional rights of infants to prevent
the deportation of their noncitizen parents).
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eleven districts issued collective decisions regarding the constitutionality of
the new U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”).172 The Guidelines cases
illustrate the diversity of approaches that district courts have used when
issuing collective decisions. Most were full en bancs involving joint hearings
and decisions, although they were not always unanimous.173 The Eastern
District of Arkansas used an adopted decision, in which one judge resolved
a particular case and other judges concurred in the legal conclusion.174 In
the District of Arizona, some judges used a coordinated decision to explain
their reasoning while resolving their individual cases through separate
orders.175 The decision of the Western District of Missouri—which the
Supreme Court reviewed in Mistretta v. United States176—was the most
fragmented of the collective decisions.177 While the judges heard argument
together,178 they did not all join the decision.179 The authoring judge instead
noted that three of the judges had “authorized” him to indicate that they
agreed that the Guidelines were constitutional, while the chief judge filed a
“dissenting” opinion to explain that he would continue “to utilize the
Guidelines strictly on an advisory basis,”180 even though it would create a
divergent practice within the district.
D. Recent Examples (Since 1990)
Since 1990, collective district court proceedings have generally fallen into
two categories: those pertaining to sensitive political disputes and those
pertaining to overlapping issues in criminal or habeas cases. The first
category includes the District of Hawaii’s rejection of a constitutional
172. Others have identified 14 such decisions, but three of these are not available in
Westlaw. For additional discussion of the en banc decisions in the Sentencing Guidelines
cases, see Sisk et al., supra note 15, at 1416; Taha, supra note 15.
173. The Southern District of Florida split 12–4 with two dissenting opinions. See United
States v. Bogle, 693 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D. Fla. 1988). The Central District of California split
15–9, though the dissenters noted that they intended to follow the majority’s approach to
ensure “uniformity of decision . . . pending final resolution of the problem.” United States v.
Ortega Lopez, 684 F. Supp. 1506, 1515 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (Hupp, J., dissenting).
174. See United States v. Macias-Pedroza, 694 F. Supp. 1406, 1409, 1419 (D. Ariz. 1988).
175. See United States v. Brittman, 687 F. Supp. 1329, 1331 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (noting that
all the judges agreed to follow a “two track” sentencing approach pending Supreme Court
resolution, even though “they may not individually agree with the undersigned as to all of the
different grounds set forth in the following opinion” and even though one judge dissented),
rev’d, 872 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1989).
176. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
177. See United States v. Johnson, 682 F. Supp. 1033 (W.D. Mo. 1988), aff’d, Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
178. See id. at 1033 (noting hearing before seven judges).
179. See id. at 1033 n.1 (accounting for views of five judges, including one dissent); see
also United States v. Terrill, 688 F. Supp. 542, 543, 543 n.2 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (noting that,
“[s]trictly speaking, the judges who heard the oral arguments [in Johnson] were not ‘sitting en
banc,’” and explaining that he and two other judges “considered the briefs and heard the oral
arguments [in Johnson] but did not indicate any view with regard to the questions presented.”).
The judge in Terrill, coincidentally, was the authoring judge for the district’s earlier en banc
decisions in Pedicord v. Swenson, 304 F. Supp. 393 (W.D. Mo. 1969), aff’d, 431 F.2d 92
(1970), and White v. Swenson, 261 F. Supp. 42 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
180. Johnson, 682 F. Supp. at 1038 (Wright, C.J., dissenting).
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challenge to a state statute that effectively blocked a Republican candidate
from the gubernatorial ballot,181 the Eastern District of Arkansas’s rejection
of an ethics complaint against independent counsel Kenneth Starr for his
handling of the grand jury in the Whitewater investigation,182 and the District
of Nevada’s rejection of efforts by state legislators and citizens to block
legislative action mandated by the state supreme court.183 The second
category includes cases like Banks v. Gonzales,184 which rejected
constitutional objections of probationers to the collection of their DNA, and
United States v. Jones,185 which rejected a constitutional challenge to
“Project Exile,” an arrangement by which state prosecutors referred select
cases to federal authorities.
There appear to have been few district court en bancs over the last decade,
however. Part III considers whether alternative tools have displaced some of
the need for voluntary collective district court adjudication.
III. BENEFITS AND ALTERNATIVES
This part provides a second perspective on the practice of district court en
bancs by drawing out the rationales for collective decision-making and
considering what other institutional mechanisms judges have for achieving
similar ends. For some purposes—like the husbanding of judicial
resources—judges have developed alternative mechanisms that have largely
displaced the need for voluntary collective adjudication. For others—like the
need for enhanced legitimacy—there are arguably fewer alternatives
available today than there were fifty years ago. Part IV considers, in light of
this remaining need, what future district en bancs might look like.
A. Judicial Economy
As Part II described, judicial economy was a significant rationale for
collective proceedings by the 1970s. District courts used ad hoc collective
proceedings when a high volume of similar cases temporarily overwhelmed
181. See Fasi v. Cayetano, 752 F. Supp. 942, 951, 954–55 (D. Haw. 1990).
182. See In re Starr, 986 F. Supp. 1159, 1160 (E.D. Ark. 1997). Four judges had recused
themselves; the remaining four judges split 3–1 in dismissing the complaint. See generally id.
(Eisele, J., concurring in part).
183. See Angle v. Legislature of the State of Nev., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1153–56 (D. Nev.
2003) (invoking the Rooker-Feldman doctrine), aff’d sub nom. Amodei v. Nev. State Senate,
99 F. App’x 90 (9th Cir. 2004).
184. 415 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (N.D. Okla. 2006), aff’d, Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178
(10th Cir. 2007).
185. 36 F. Supp. 2d 304 (E.D. Va. 1999). Other examples of recent collective decisions in
criminal cases include United States v. Vidal-Cruz, 67 F. Supp. 2d 35, 37 & n.2 (D.P.R. 1999)
(rejecting identical jurisdictional challenges to indictments in thirteen criminal cases); United
States v. Shine, 571 F. Supp. 2d 589, 590–91 (D. Vt. 2008) (rejecting challenges to jury
selection process raised by multiple criminal defendants); and Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n v. Walsh, Nos. 09 CV 1749, 09 CV 1750, 09 CR 722, 2010 WL 882875 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 9, 2010) (jointly determining whether assets frozen by one judge in relation to a civil
agency enforcement action should be unfrozen to pay the defendants’ attorneys’ fees in a
related criminal case before the other judge).
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a district’s docket, like the longshoremen cases in the late 1960s or the
asbestos litigation in the 1980s.186 Sometimes the set of cases necessitating
collective review is more geographically isolated, like a failed Ponzi scheme
in the District of Utah that generated “[o]ver 1,000 appeals” from the
bankruptcy court187 or the eighty-four criminal indictments stemming from
the Mariel boatlift dismissed by the Southern District of Florida in United
States v. Anaya.188
Other times, judges have sought to avoid duplication of efforts in more
narrow circumstances: not because a set of cases was clogging the court’s
dockets but because separately assigned cases raised identical issues. By
coordinating their hearings and decisions in such cases, judges can avoid
reinventing the wheel (and reduce the pressure on attorneys to do the same)
while also gaining the benefit of collective decision-making and input from
a broader range of litigants. The use of such coordinated decisions appears
to have peaked in the 1970s and 1980s,189 but there are also earlier and later
examples.190
This need for coordination to avoid duplication of effort and to manage
mass litigation, however, also generated other procedural reforms, which
have largely displaced the need for voluntary collective adjudication to
address concerns for judicial economy.
1. Multidistrict Litigation
The MDL statute grew out of the district courts’ experience with the
electrical equipment price-fixing litigation crisis, in which “[o]ver 1800 cases
were filed in thirty-five federal districts.”191 The judicial sponsors of the
MDL statute were worried about future “big cases”—like antitrust and
securities litigation—similarly clogging the dockets of the federal courts.192
Their solution was to allow related cases filed in multiple districts to be
brought together before a single district judge for purposes of pretrial
proceedings.193 That MDL judge would then have significant discretion and
flexibility to innovate procedural solutions to complex problems.194
186. See supra Part II.C.
187. Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep. Clearing House Co.), 77 B.R. 843, 847 n.1 (D. Utah
1987).
188. 509 F. Supp. 289, 293 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (noting the “avoid[ance of] . . . unnecessary
duplication of effort” as a rationale for an en banc proceeding involving all twelve of the
district’s judges), aff’d, United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir. 1982).
189. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Prentiss v. Nat’l Airlines, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 306 (D.N.J. 1953) (addressing
constitutionality of state statute raised as a defense in multiple cases involving commercial
airplane crashes); see also supra note 100 (discussing more recent coordination by Judge
Weinstein across district lines).
191. Bradt, supra note 160, at 854–56.
192. Id. at 852–53; see also Margaret S. Williams, The Effect of Multidistrict Litigation on
the Federal Judiciary over the Past 50 Years, 53 GA. L. REV. 1245, 1261 (2019) (“[I]t was
initially thought centralization [by MDL] would be for securities and antitrust matters.”).
193. For an overview of how MDL works, see Bradt, supra note 160, at 842–43.
194. See id. at 839 (arguing that this is what the drafters intended). The procedural
innovation encouraged by MDLs has itself been the source of much commentary. See, e.g.,
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Coincidentally, the primary author of the MDL statute, Judge William H.
Becker,195 was also chief judge of the Western District of Missouri when the
district issued multiple significant collective opinions.196 That personal
experience might explain why the MDL statute permits more than one district
judge to be assigned to an MDL,197 an option that courts have occasionally
exercised.198
The statute was not widely used, however, through the 1970s and 1980s.199
That changed in the 1990s, as MDL became a primary method for
aggregating mass tort cases200 in parallel with the curtailment of federal class
actions by the Supreme Court.201 While class actions cannot aggregate cases
in which individual issues predominate, MDLs require only “one or more
common questions of fact.”202 They have thus enabled consolidation of
cases alleging similar harms, alleviating some need for district court en
bancs. Indeed, the asbestos litigation was itself a turning point for MDLs: it
led to one of the first and most significant “mega” MDLs when remaining
cases were consolidated before Judge Charles R. Weiner in the Eastern
Engstrom, supra note 20, at 9–10 (summarizing debate over ad hoc procedure, much of which
pertains to MDLs); Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict
Litigation’s Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669,
1689 (2017) (describing “the very hallmark of the MDL” as “the ability to deviate from
traditional procedures”); Zachary D. Clopton, MDL as Category, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1297
(2020) (warning against overgeneralizations about typical MDLs when debating procedural
reforms for MDLs).
195. See Bradt, supra note 160, at 838.
196. See generally White v. Swenson, 261 F. Supp. 42 (W.D. Mo. 1966); General Order
on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax
Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
197. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (“Such coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings shall
be conducted by a judge or judges to whom such actions are assigned . . . .” (emphasis added)).
198. See In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 427 F. Supp. 701, 702 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1977)
(reproducing order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) that assigned MDL
to two judges); see also, e.g., In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 557 F. Supp. 1091 (N.D.
Ill. 1983) (indicating MDL before two judges); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chi., Ill., on May
25, 1979, 500 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (indicating MDL before same two judges). For
an example of the JPML directing judges to coordinate without formally instituting an MDL,
see Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. RBS Sec., Inc., CV 11-5887, 2014 WL 12597071, at *1
(C.D. Cal. June 10, 2014) (noting JPML’s deference to intradistrict consolidation within three
districts and subsequent interdistrict coordination across the three districts). Professor Brian
Fitzpatrick recently called for increased use of multi-judge MDLs. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick,
Many Minds, Many MDL Judges, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 118–19 (2021).
199. See Bradt, supra note 160, at 838.
200. See Williams, supra note 192, at 1267 fig.6 (mapping subject matter of proceedings
established by the JPML over time). As Margaret Williams has noted, the number of cases
assigned to MDL before 1991 was “well below 10,000,” but it subsequently climbed to over
40,000 cases. See id. at 1270 fig.7.
201. See, e.g., AmChem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). On this parallel
development of class action curtailment and expanded MDLs, see generally Thomas E.
Willging & Emery G. Lee, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate
Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775 (2010).
202. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). In the 1960s, some opponents to the then-pending MDL
legislation proposed amendments that would prevent aggregation when individual issues
predominated, but the judicial sponsors of the bill successfully opposed these amendments,
claiming that the amendments would “cripple the bill.” See Bradt, supra note 160, at 896–98.
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District of Pennsylvania in 1991.203 But an MDL also requires cases
“pending in different districts,”204 which cannot reach the problem of related
cases filed solely within a single district. That problem has instead been
addressed through the use of case assignment rules.
2. Case Assignment Rules
Congress has granted district courts flexibility in managing the division of
their workload.205 Under that authority, most districts have adopted some
form of a related-cases rule that allows cases with overlapping facts or issues
to be channeled to a single judge.206 There is much variation among these
rules, however: some courts leave it to the judges’ discretion whether to
transfer related cases to one another;207 others expect parties to move for
transfer;208 yet others task the chief judge or an executive committee with
making the final decision.209 The Northern District of Illinois even has a
mini-MDL rule that allows for pretrial coordination by a single judge of
overlapping cases not covered by the MDL statute or the district’s
related-cases rule.210
These rules serve multiple purposes. As one district judge has explained,
“The reason we have relatedness rules in the district courts is to avoid treating
similar cases dissimilarly and because it wastes judicial resources by
duplicating effort when two judges deal with similar issues.”211 They are
also intended to prevent parties from gaming the random assignment of cases
by voluntarily dismissing cases and then refiling them in hopes of being
assigned to a more favorable judge. Thus, some districts include in their
definition of “related cases” those that are similar to cases that have been
terminated within the last year.212

203. See Willging & Lee, supra note 201, at 798–99.
204. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
205. Id. § 137(a); see also supra note 68. For a strong defense of a district court’s authority
to self-regulate its case assignments, see Jack B. Weinstein, The Limited Power of the Federal
Courts of Appeals to Order a Case Reassigned to Another District Judge, 120 F.R.D. 267
(1988).
206. Given the difficulty of tracing changes in local rules, it is hard to ascertain when most
districts adopted these rules. Based on the rise and then fall of coordinated decisions during
the 1970s and 1980s, however, my hypothesis would be that districts began formalizing
related-cases rules in the 1980s and 1990s. Ad hoc assignment is also possible: in 2003, the
Eastern District of New York transferred 500 state prisoner habeas corpus cases to Judge
Weinstein, empowering him to clear the backlog by the end of the year. In re Habeas Corpus
Cases, 298 F. Supp. 2d 303, 304 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
207. See, e.g., W.D. MO. L.R. 83.9(c)(4); W.D. WASH. GEN. ORDER 02-18.
208. See, e.g., M.D. FLA. L.R. 1.04; N.D. ILL. L.R. 40.4.
209. See, e.g., E.D. PA. L.R. 40.1(c)(2) (chief judge); N.D. ILL. L.R. 40.4(d) (executive
committee).
210. N.D. ILL. IOP13(e).
211. Richard George Kopf, A Cheap Shot, HERCULES & THE UMPIRE (Nov. 3, 2013),
https://herculesandtheumpire.com/2013/11/03/a-cheap-shot/
[https://perma.cc/7HWALKW3].
212. See, e.g., E.D. PA. L.R. 40.1(b)(3) (limiting the definition of related cases to those that
are pending or were terminated within the last year). Indeed, the Northern District of Texas
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Related-cases rules have been criticized, however, for allowing judges in
turn to game the random case assignment process.213 Related-cases rules are
particularly prone to such abuse when they are not time-limited, allowing
judges to lay claim to new filings over multiple decades.214 The argument
for grouping related cases grows weaker the farther apart in time the cases
are filed: the likelihood that a party dismissed a case and refiled it in hopes
of obtaining a friendlier judge decreases as more time passes, and there is
less economy of scale if a judge is not deciding two related cases
concurrently. Further, once a judge has resolved a case with a written
decision, all of the district’s judges would have access to that reasoning in
terms of avoiding unintentionally inconsistent judgments in subsequently
filed cases.215 But regardless of detail or potential for reform, case
assignment mechanisms may well have displaced the need for coordinated
decisions when addressing overlapping issues in complex cases.
3. Legislative Intervention
Finally, when a major crisis threatens to swamp the district courts,
Congress can legislate specifically to reduce, redirect, or reformulate those
cases. Professors Pamela Bookman and David Noll have termed this
phenomenon “ad hoc procedural legislation.”216 The Portal-to-Portal Act of
1947, with its jurisdiction-stripping provision, is a particularly aggressive
example.217 Other examples include the codification of the bankruptcy trust
solution for resolving asbestos claims218 and the handling of the September
11th Victim Compensation Fund.219 The channeling of certain classes of
cases to three-judge courts was also a form of legislative intervention.
Although district courts themselves cannot legislate special solutions to
particular problems, these legislative interventions have often come at the
behest of, or reflect the innovations proposed by, district judges.220
explicitly calls out cases “that the plaintiff dismissed with the intent or for the purpose of
obtaining a different assigned presiding judge.” N.D. TEX. L.R. 3.3(b)(1).
213. See, e.g., Katherine A. Macfarlane, The Danger of Nonrandom Case Assignment:
How the Southern District of New York’s “Related Cases” Rule Shaped Stop-and-Frisk
Rulings, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 199 (2014). The Southern District of New York subsequently
amended its rule to decrease the discretion of individual judges. See id.
214. See Jay Krishnan, Bhopal in the Federal Courts: How Indian Victims Failed to Get
Justice in the United States, 72 RUTGERS L. REV. 101 (2020) (building on Macfarlane’s work
to critique the use of the Southern District of New York’s related cases rule to direct all cases
related to the Bhopal gas disaster over thirty years to a single judge).
215. Cf. Macfarlane, supra note 213 (suggesting reforms to related cases rules).
216. Bookman & Noll, supra note 21, at 788.
217. For a discussion of the Portal-to-Portal Act, see supra note 128 and accompanying
text.
218. See Bookman & Noll, supra note 21, at 804–10 (discussing the adoption and effect of
11 U.S.C. § 524(g), which codified the bankruptcy trust solution devised by Johns-Manville
Corporation to resolve future asbestos-related claims).
219. See, e.g., Robin J. Effron, Event Jurisdiction and Protective Coordination: Lessons
from the September 11th Litigation, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 199 (2008) (discussing Congress’s
efforts to channel litigation pertaining to September 11 to the Southern District of New York).
220. See, e.g., Bookman & Noll, supra note 21, at 804–10 (describing how the
Johns-Manville Corporation trust solution to asbestos litigation began as a procedural
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In sum, both MDL and related-cases rules allow for the grouping of cases
with some overlapping issues, even if those cases are not similar enough to
permit aggregation under rules of joinder or class action. Congress has also
proved willing to provide simplified procedures or procedural flexibility
when judges are worried about related cases overwhelming their dockets.
The need for collective proceedings to avoid inefficient duplication of effort
is thus much smaller today than it was fifty years ago. Note, however, that
these procedural developments relate primarily to civil litigation; the need to
coordinate regarding recurrent legal questions in criminal cases has
continued to generate some coordinated decisions.221
B. Consistency
Consistent answers to legal questions promote equitable treatment of
litigants, regardless of which judge is assigned to their case.222 Within the
federal judiciary, consistency is achieved primarily through vertical stare
decisis. But there are times when the appellate courts simply cannot provide
the uniformity required—what Professor Elizabeth Y. McCuskey has termed
the “vertical vacuum.”223 As Professor Stephen Yeazell has argued, that
vertical vacuum grew much larger during the twentieth century, as the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure increased the importance of judicial
management and the difficult-to-review phase of litigation between pleading
and trial.224
It should not be surprising, then, that district courts have turned to
collective decisions to resolve recurrent questions that evade appellate
review,225 like the transfer of cases226 and the interpretation of discovery
innovation in a pending case and evolved into congressional legislation); Bradt, supra note
160, at 907–15 (describing the active role of judges in the adoption of the MDL statute).
221. See supra Part II.D (gathering recent examples).
222. See, e.g., Belgian Am. Invs. & Trade, Inc. v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 717 F.
Supp. 462, 465 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (“The right to litigate in a particular forum should not depend
upon the random assignment of a case to the docket of a particular judge in that forum.”); In
re Stein, 17 F. Supp. 587, 589 (E.D. Pa. 1936) (Dickinson, J., dissenting) (“There should be a
uniform rule of decision and the parties not left to the accident of to whom the cause is referred
or the judge who hears the petition for review.”).
223. Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Horizontal Procedure 27–28, 30 (2017) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (noting that some Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
almost solely cited by district courts).
224. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process,
1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 660–62, 665 (connecting this phenomenon as well as the shift to more
deferential standards of review to reduced appellate oversight of many procedural decisions).
225. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania has used delegated panels to ameliorate disparate
treatment of trial motions that would be difficult to appeal. See, e.g., Colombo v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 601 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (noting that a prior decision
in that case to permit the defendants to implead the United States conflicted with the
subsequent panel decision in Lovallo v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 99 F.R.D. 627 (E.D. Pa.
1983), in which the same judge had participated); Kohr v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 522 F.
Supp. 1070, 1077 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Troutman, J., concurring) (acknowledging that the panel
decision required one of the judges to “reverse,” in part, a prior ruling in a similar case).
226. See, e.g., Pontes v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (transferring
longshoremen cases); Hayes v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 79 F. Supp. 821, 826 (D. Minn.
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rules.227 A number of districts have used collective proceedings to address
motions to remand,228 which are generally not appealable.229 The Northern
District of Alabama has done so twice: it first issued a collective decision in
1982 regarding the “recurring and vexing” question of calculating time limits
for removing cases that include fictitious defendants.230 In 1988, however,
Congress amended the removal statute in a manner that conflicted with the
Northern District’s prior guidance and caused defendants in more than 150
pending state court cases to rush to remove to federal court.231 To address
the problem, all nine of the district’s judges participated in an en banc
proceeding that reversed the district’s prior position.232
Other questions arise at the same time in many cases, risking disparate
treatment of parties before appellate review can be obtained.233 For example,
even though the Supreme Court quickly agreed to address the

1948) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1404 displaced prior Supreme Court dictum that forum non
conveniens does not apply to Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) cases).
227. This includes the civil procedure classic Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa.
1945), rev’d, 153 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1945), aff’d, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Other collective
decisions have addressed whether plaintiffs can have their attorneys present during a Rule 35
examination, Dziwanoski v. Ocean Carriers Corp., 26 F.R.D. 595 (D. Md. 1960); whether
defendants must disclose insurance policy limits, Slomberg v. Pennabaker, 42 F.R.D. 8 (M.D.
Pa. 1967); Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp. 476 (D.N.J. 1962); and whether personal injury
plaintiffs can obtain discovery of surveillance footage of themselves, Snead v. Am.
Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
228. See, e.g., Belgian Am. Invs. & Trade, Inc. v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 717 F.
Supp. 462, 465 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (agreeing on whether certain savings and loan cases could
be removed to federal court); Beckwith v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 68 F. Supp. 353, 353
(N.D. Cal. 1946) (remanding multiple Jones Act claims brought by seamen alleging they were
negligently abandoned in Manila at the outbreak of World War II, resulting in their capture
and imprisonment by Japanese forces); Knapp v. Byram, 21 F.2d 226, 227, 230–31 (D. Minn.
1927) (holding that FELA cases could be removed when brought against receivers appointed
as “officers of that court”).
229. See, e.g., Andrew D. Bradt, Grable on the Ground: Mitigating Unchecked
Jurisdictional Discretion, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1153 (2011) (studying the effects of remand
orders being shielded from appellate review).
230. Hamby v. Zayre Corp., 544 F. Supp. 176, 177 (N.D. Ala. 1982) (“Hopefully, this
opinion, [adopted en banc] . . . will provide guidance to the trial bar in navigating through
these troubled waters.”). All seven judges of the district, including senior judges, signed the
decision. Id. at 179.
231. See Greer v. Skilcraft, 704 F. Supp. 1570, 1572 (N.D. Ala. 1989).
232. Id. at 1583. The effect of this reversal was that some defendants, who had relied on
Hamby to wait to remove their cases, were effectively barred from removing to federal court
because they had exceeded the time limits now clearly enunciated in the federal statute.
See id.
233. See, e.g., United States v. Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 289, 293 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (justifying
en banc proceeding, in part, by its ability to “establish uniformity of treatment for similarly
situated [criminal] defendants,” the “significance” of which, “from both an individual and
societal point of view, cannot be understated”), aff’d, United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685
F.2d 1272 (11th Cir. 1982); Turner v. Transportacion Maritima Mexicana S.A., 44 F.R.D. 412,
414 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (justifying the panel decision as providing “uniformity of action”
regarding hundreds of cases “pending a definitive ruling” by the circuit court); Close v. Calmar
S.S. Corp., 44 F.R.D. 398, 401 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (same), aff’d sub nom. Blake v. Farrell
Lines, Inc., 417 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1969).
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constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in 1988,234 some districts
justified collective proceedings in light of the need “to promote procedural
uniformity and avoid disparate sentencing” pending final resolution by the
Supreme Court.235 When intradistrict splits do arise, collective proceedings
may help to ameliorate them.236
Appellate review similarly does not reach the management of the district
court as an institution.237 The Northern District of Texas used an en banc
decision in 1989 “for the purpose of establishing standards of litigation
conduct to be observed in civil actions,”238 while a 1979 en banc decision by
the Western District of Missouri clarified local rule limitations on
discovery.239 The District of Maryland has twice used en banc decisions to
address whether convicted federal felons must exhaust federal pardon
procedures before seeking admission to its bar.240 District courts are also
charged with supervising bankruptcy judges (or, previously, bankruptcy
referees); when questions will likely arise repeatedly in bankruptcy cases,
then, district courts have at times used en bancs to establish uniform
answers.241
Collective proceedings are not a panacea for establishing intradistrict
uniformity, however. The resulting decisions are not binding,242 and efforts
234. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989) (noting that the Court had granted
certiorari before judgment by the Eighth Circuit because of the importance of the issue and
“the disarray among the Federal District Courts”).
235. See United States v. Bogle, 689 F. Supp. 1121, 1123 (S.D. Fla. 1988); see also United
States v. Allen, 685 F. Supp. 827, 828 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (“Because of the desirability of
consistency, the judges of this court—like those in several other districts—have elected to
consider collectively this issue.” (footnote omitted)).
236. See Olivieri v. Adams, 280 F. Supp. 428, 429 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (explaining that,
“because of conflicting views” within the district, “a panel of judges was appointed by the
court” to decide a question of pendent party jurisdiction in order to “establish uniformity of
action within the district pending a definitive ruling by the Court of Appeals”); see also
Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp. 476, 477–78 (D.N.J. 1946) (noting consensus of the
district’s judges in a discovery ruling that conflicted with a prior ruling from the same district);
Brown v. C.D. Mallory & Co. (The Swiftarrow), 34 F. Supp. 541, 543 (E.D. Pa. 1940)
(“Because of the conflict in the decisions cited, the court en banc took under consideration the
question presented in the instant proceeding.”), rev’d on other grounds 122 F.2d 98 (3d Cir.
1941).
237. On the distinction between the work of individual judges and the work of “the court”
as an institution, see generally James E. Pfander, The Chief Justice, the Appointment of
Inferior Officers, and the “Court of Law” Requirement, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1125 (2013).
238. Dondi Props. Corp. v. Com. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 286 (N.D. Tex.
1988).
239. Crown Ctr. Redevelopment Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 82 F.RD. 108 (W.D.
Mo. 1979).
240. In In re R.M.W., the court “determined en banc . . . [to] explicitly overrule[]” a prior
en banc decision that had required such exhaustion. 428 F. Supp. 2d 389, 391 (D. Md. 2006)
(overruling In the Matter of G.L.S., 586 F. Supp. 375 (D. Md. 1984)).
241. See, e.g., In re Ret. Inn at Forest Lane, Ltd., 83 B.R. 795, 800 (D. Utah 1988)
(implementing “new procedure regarding the disposition of all motions for transfer of venue”
brought before bankruptcy judges); In re Stein, 17 F. Supp. 587, 590 (E.D. Pa. 1936)
(explaining that the case was “set down for a hearing before the court in banc so that
[bankruptcy] referees would have an authoritative guide” to recurrent questions).
242. See supra Part I.B.
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to achieve consensus can fail. Recall in this regard the lack of consensus
within the Western District of Missouri regarding how to handle sentencing
pending Supreme Court resolution of the constitutionality of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines.243 Similarly, a judge-initiated effort at prison reform
divided the judges of the D.C. District in 1971, with Judge Gerhard A. Gesell
asserting that the full court was behind his emergency sentencing procedure
for juvenile offenders244 but with Judge Charles R. Richey refusing a month
later to follow it and noting he had never agreed with Judge Gesell’s
recommendation.245 Other options for promoting intradistrict consistency
include the principle of intra-court comity, interlocutory appeals, and local
rules and orders.
1. Intra-Court Comity
District judges can promote intradistrict uniformity by voluntarily
following each other’s precedent, a principle referred to as “intra-court
comity.” In its strong form, intra-court comity directs that “[j]udges of the
same district court customarily follow a previous decision of a brother judge
upon the same question except in unusual or exceptional circumstances.”246
Intra-court comity is not the same as stare decisis; rather, it puts a thumb on
the scale in favor of uniformity within the district while still allowing judges
to forge a different path if they so desire. It is the principle of intra-court
comity, not stare decisis, that gives extra weight to district court en bancs and
encourages adherence to them in future cases.247

243. See supra notes 177–80 and accompanying text.
244. See United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973, 974 n.1 (D.D.C. 1971).
245. United States v. Lowery, 335 F. Supp. 519, 520–22 (1971). This disagreement was
not mentioned in Alsbrook. A similar disagreement played out in the Western District of North
Carolina in the 1980s: initially, Judge James B. McMillan had ordered the court clerk to seek
judicial review before ex parte forfeiture warrants could be issued, an order which Judge
Robert Daniel Potter also signed. See United States v. B&M Used Cars, 860 F.2d 121, 122–
23 nn.1–2 (4th Cir. 1988) (discussing procedural history of the dispute). On the government’s
motion to reconsider, however, Judge Potter reversed course and joined with Judge David
Sentelle to vacate the prior order. In re Issuance of Warrants by Clerks, 674 F. Supp. 1182,
1183 (W.D.N.C. 1986). The unsigned order stated that “any rule of this District Court should
be voted upon by a majority of the active judges,” with “the majority of the active judges”
now siding with the government over Judge McMillan’s dissent. Id.
246. Buna v. Pac. Far E. Line, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1360, 1365 (N.D. Cal. 1977); accord, e.g.,
Fricker v. Town of Foster, 596 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (D.R.I. 1984) (quoting similar language
and explaining that “[w]hile the judges of a unified federal district are not constitutionally or
legally bound to march in lockstep, the seeds of chaos are sown if a single court prances off
in sharply conflicting directions”); E. W. Bliss Co. v. Cold Metal Process Co., 174 F. Supp.
99, 121 (N.D. Ohio 1959) (“In this District, we have five District Judges but only one United
States District Court. When the Court speaks through one of the Judges, the decision should
be followed by his colleagues unless it is clearly wrong.”); see also Mead, supra note 15, at
801 n.101 (gathering similar statements from older cases).
247. See, e.g., Close v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 44 F.R.D. 398, 401 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (“The
use of this panel procedure does not actually bind the other judges of this District to follow
the decision . . . but, like application of the doctrine of intra-court comity, this practice does
help provide for a uniform interpretation of the law within any one District”), aff’d sub nom.
Blake v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 417 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1969).
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Intra-court comity should discourage intradistrict splits without resort to
en banc proceedings. Yet, as Joseph A. Mead has argued, “the modern trend
is moving away from extending any deference” to intradistrict precedent.248
There are a couple of possible explanations for this shift. One is simply the
growing size of the federal judiciary. A district that has just expanded from
one to two or three judges may follow prior district decisions out of habit or
interpersonal necessity. As judgeships expanded in bursts over the twentieth
century, judges may have become more comfortable with the (ever more
common) phenomenon of intradistrict disagreements, reducing the
motivation to avoid or resolve them.
Another possibility is that an increase in intradistrict comity was displaced
by the 1960s by an increase in intra-circuit uniformity. Appellate en bancs
only emerged as a practice in the 1940s,249 which in turn enabled the circuits
to refine “law of the circuit” doctrines over the course of the 1960s and
1970s.250 Today, it is settled doctrine that circuit court panels establish
binding “law of the circuit” unless and until the court sitting en banc says
otherwise.251 As Mead has noted, the development of stronger circuit
uniformity coincided with the decline of intra-court comity within the district
courts.252
Reinvigorating the principle of intra-court comity might provide an
alternative to district court en bancs for promoting intradistrict uniformity,
but it carries some costs. Relying on intradistrict citation to build consistency
involves a time lag, which sends weaker signals to litigants; it also runs the
risk of judges overlooking prior decisions by colleagues. Intra-court comity
is also an easy principle to over-apply. I have elsewhere documented the
dangers of overreliance on district court precedent: when judges cite district
court decisions to establish facts, identify nonfederal law, or develop
analogical shortcuts, they risk distorting the common-law process and
skewing the substantive development of the law.253 If districts were to
embrace again a strong principle of intra-court comity, they should be careful
to limit its application to questions of federal law and perhaps more narrowly
to questions of federal procedural law.

248. Mead, supra note 15, at 801–02. Indeed, a recent treatise on precedent barely
mentions the principle. See GARNER ET AL., supra note 15, at 515 (acknowledging only that
“it hasn’t been uncommon for district courts to say that they will follow . . . district precedent
‘absent unusual or exceptional circumstances’” (quoting Kelly v. Wehrum, 956 F. Supp. 1369,
1372–73 (S.D. Ohio 1997))).
249. Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc
Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 227–29 (1999) (noting that the Third and Ninth Circuits
initially raised the idea of en bancs in the late 1930s, the Supreme Court approved of the
practice in 1941, and Congress codified it in 1948).
250. See Mead, supra note 15, at 796.
251. See, e.g., id. at 800.
252. Id. at 802.
253. See generally Maggie Gardner, Dangerous Citations, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1619 (2020).

1580

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

2. Interlocutory Appeal
In 1958, Congress adopted 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which allows district
courts to certify questions for interlocutory appeal,254 potentially reducing
the scope of the vertical vacuum. “In theory,” Professor Bryan Lammon has
explained, § 1292(b) “provides a valuable source of flexibility”—but “[i]n
practice, [it] has proved unsatisfactory” because it is “severely
underused.”255 There are several reasons for that underuse. First, both the
district judge and the appellate court must exercise their discretion to permit
the appeal.256 That dual discretion is not necessarily a bad model, but it does
mean that overzealous gatekeeping by each court can combine to suppress
potentially helpful appeals.
Second, the courts are divided over the circumstances in which such
interlocutory appeals are, in fact, appropriate. The statute permits
interlocutory appeals when they “may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation.”257 That suggests a focus on avoiding
unnecessary litigation and trial costs, a focus that is supported by the
provision’s legislative history.258 Scholars have thus debated whether
§ 1292(b) is an appropriate vehicle for interlocutory appeals that will not
necessarily shorten litigation—for example, if interlocutory appeal would
serve instead to avoid irreparable prejudice to parties or (of particular
relevance here) to resolve a recurrent issue that evades appellate review.259
Nonetheless, some courts have used § 1292(b) for this latter purpose.260
Even if underused, then, interlocutory appeals can provide at least a partial
alternative path for promoting consistency for issues that fall within the
vertical vacuum.261
254. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 31, at 33 & n.93.
255. Bryan Lammon, Three Ideas for Discretionary Appeals, 53 AKRON L. REV. 639, 645
(2019). In a recent study covering 2013–2019, the Federal Judicial Center reported that
district courts had certified only 636 applications under § 1292(b) and that the federal circuits
granted only about 52 percent of the applications that reached them, meaning that they agreed
to consider the merits of the appeal. EMERY G. LEE III ET AL., PERMISSIVE INTERLOCUTORY
APPEALS, 2013–2019, at 2 (2020).
256. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
257. Id.
258. See Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88
HARV. L. REV. 607, 611–12 (1975) [hereinafter Interlocutory Appeals] (arguing that the
legislative history demonstrates that the exclusive purpose of § 1292(b) was to avoid
unnecessary trials).
259. Compare id. at 635 (arguing no), with Lammon, supra note 255, at 645 (arguing yes),
and Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1193–94 (1990) (arguing yes).
260. See Interlocutory Appeals, supra note 258, at 635 & n.117 (gathering cases).
261. The Supreme Court has also approved the supervisory use of mandamus to address
important and recurrent issues that fall within the vertical vacuum. See Schlagenhauf v.
Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964) (addressing a federal court’s authority to compel a defendant to
undergo a physical examination); see also Interlocutory Appeals, supra note 258, at 632 &
nn. 102–03 (noting that Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964), indicates that the need
for uniformity can “justify use of the writ of mandamus to settle an important issue of first
impression which would not be reviewable on final appeal”). Another option would be to
leverage 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e), which invites the use of rulemaking to specify further grounds
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3. Local Rules and Orders
Some procedural questions might also be addressed ex ante through
administrative action by the district courts. While local rulemaking was long
a source of controversy given the opaqueness of its process and the
proliferation of resulting rules,262 a series of reforms in the 1980s and 1990s
have ameliorated those problems. Rule 83 was amended in 1985 to require
notice and comment for local rule changes,263 a requirement that Congress
wrote into statutory law in 1988.264 Further amendments to Rule 83 in 1995
encouraged districts to make local rules simpler and easier to use.265 They
must also be made publicly available266 (districts routinely post them on their
court websites267). In short, over the last thirty years, local rulemaking has
become more transparent, more participatory, and subject to greater review.
One benefit local rulemaking has over en banc decisions is that local rules
can be adopted by a mere majority of the district’s judges and are then
binding on every judge in the district until they are amended or abrogated.268
But local rules are also limited by their prospective adoption and general
application. In contrast, some issues are only crystallized through the facts
of a case or set of cases. Opinions also allow judges to say more about a
particular issue, providing detailed justification and greater rhetorical
emphasis,269 which is itself a form of guidance to attorneys practicing in the
district.

for interlocutory appeals; that invitation has been used, for example, to permit discretionary
appeals of class certification decisions under Rule 23(f). See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 committee’s
note to 1998 amendments.
262. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee’s note to 1985 amendments (gathering
critical scholarship); 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3152 (3d ed. 2021) (describing critical studies of local
rules since the 1930s); Samuel P. Jordan, Local Rules and the Limits of Trans-Territorial
Procedure, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415, 436 (2010) (noting history of local rules that were
inconsistent with federal rules); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State
Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999,
2012 (1989) (arguing that the Conformity Act was an effort by Congress to rein in the
proliferation of local rules).
263. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee’s note to 1985 amendments.
264. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 262, § 3152 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2071).
265. Specifically, the amendments prohibited local rules that merely repeated federal rules
or statutory requirements, required that local rules be numbered consistently, and limited
sanctions for nonwillful noncompliance. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee’s note to
1995 amendments.
266. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(d).
267. See, e.g., Local Rules, U.S. DIST. CT.: DIST. OF KAN., https://ksd.uscourts.gov/
index.php/local-rules/ [https://perma.cc/XJL8-U783] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022); Local Rules,
U.S. DIST. CT.: DIST. OF ALASKA, https://www.akd.uscourts.gov/court-info/local-rules-andorders/local-rules [https://perma.cc/52TS-RHW8] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022); District Local
Civil Rules, U.S. DIST. CT.: DIST. OF IDAHO, https://www.id.uscourts.gov/clerks/rules_orders/
Civil_Local_Rules.cfm [https://perma.cc/8FYG-87KD] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
268. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1).
269. Telephone Interview with U.S. District Judge, supra note 94 (explaining choice of en
banc opinion over local rule because an opinion would allow the judges to explain their
reasoning in greater detail and would carry more weight with the local bar).
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An intermediate option between local rules and en banc decisions is the
use of district-wide orders. The 1995 amendments to Rule 83 recognized
that district courts may use orders to “regulate practice in any manner
consistent with federal law, [the civil] rules, and the district’s local rules.”270
As the advisory committee explained, Rule 83 as revised “recognizes that
courts rely on multiple directives to control practice,” including “internal
operating procedures, standing orders, and other internal directives.”271 As
the comment suggests, the language used to label these orders varies
widely—again reflecting the diversity of the district courts. For example,
while “standing orders” usually refer to single-judge orders,272 some districts
refer to individual judge preferences by other labels, such as “judge specific
requirements”273 or “chambers procedures.”274 Meanwhile, district-wide
directives go by an even wider variety of names, including “Special
Orders,”275
“Miscellaneous
Orders,”276
“General
Orders,”277
278
“Administrative Orders,”
“Internal Operating Procedures,”279 and—
somewhat confusingly—“Standing Orders.”280
These district-wide orders are typically technical and administrative,
dealing with issues like the appointment of magistrate judges, the setting of
fee schedules, and (in recent times) court closures due to COVID-19.281
Sometimes, however, they can be more substantive. For example, some
270. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b); id. advisory committee’s note to 1995 amendments (explaining
subdivision (b)).
271. FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee’s note to 1995 amendment.
272. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee’s note to 1985 amendments (referring
to “single-judge standing orders”).
273. See, e.g., Northern District Judges, U.S. DIST. CT.: N. DIST. OF TEX.,
http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/northern-district-judges [https://perma.cc/R8J2-GASE] (last
visited Feb. 2, 2022).
274. See, e.g., Judge Richard A. Jones Chambers Procedures, U.S. DIST. CT.: W. DIST. OF
WASH., https://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/judges/jones-procedures [https://perma.cc/8UZ3KN85] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
275. See, e.g., Rules & Orders, U.S. DIST. CT.:
N. DIST. OF TEX.,
http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/rules-and-orders [https://perma.cc/7UZL-5ZGP] (last visited
Feb. 2, 2022).
276. See, e.g., id.
277. See, e.g., General Orders, U.S. DIST. CT.:
N. DIST. OF ILL.,
https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/GeneralOrders.aspx [https://perma.cc/NK7B-KDXF] (last
visited Feb. 2, 2022).
278. See, e.g., Local Rules, Standing and Administrative Orders, U.S. DIST. CT.: E. DIST.
OF PA., http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents2/local-rules [https://perma.cc/XH6NUHCU] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
279. See, e.g., Local Rules, U.S. DIST. CT.: N. DIST. OF ILL., https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/
LocalRules.aspx [https://perma.cc/68PT-J52X] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
280. See, e.g., Active Standing Orders, U.S. DIST. CT.:
DIST. OF OR.,
https://www.ord.uscourts.gov/index.php/rules-orders-and-notices/standing-orders/activestanding-orders [https://perma.cc/2TPX-4UWU] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022); Local Rules,
Standing and Administrative Orders, U.S. DIST. CT.:
E. DIST. OF PA.,
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents2/local-rules [https://perma.cc/JPD4-T5V6] (last
visited Feb. 2, 2022).
281. See, e.g., Current General Orders by Topic, U.S. DIST. CT.: W. DIST. OF WASH.,
https://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/general-orders-current [https://perma.cc/WGM8-8SX6] (last
visited Feb. 2, 2022).
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orders set out frameworks for handling discrete sets of cases, like motions
for sentence reductions under the First Step Act of 2018282 or filing
requirements for social security cases.283 Such orders may provide adequate
alternatives to en banc decisions that aim to establish frameworks for the
handling of future cases, such as, for example, the treatment of state prisoner
habeas petitions284 or the setting of bankruptcy procedures.285 The issuance
of an order might also avoid the problem of an advisory opinion in instances
in which the judges wish to coordinate their views on underlying legal
questions without resolving particular cases.286
There are some drawbacks to district-wide orders, however. Congress and
the rule makers have not regulated the process or format of such orders,
beyond a requirement that litigants have advance notice of them before being
sanctioned for noncompliance.287 There is no requirement for public notice
or comment, as there now is for local rulemaking, or for any consistent
labeling, categorization, or publication of the resulting orders—a lack of
transparency that can generate challenges by litigants.288
In short, there are alternatives to district court en bancs for promoting
intradistrict uniformity, even if no one option is perfect on its own. Local
rules offer transparency and public input, but they are limited by their
prospective and general character. District-wide orders can allow for greater
detail and need not be as transsubstantive as rules, but they must still be
prospective and are susceptible to the same criticisms that led to the reform
282. Pub. L. No. 115-391, 182 Stat. 5194 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18,
21, and 34 U.S.C.); see, e.g., Administrative Order, Defender Motions for Sentence
Reductions Under Section 404 of the First Step Act (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2019),
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/standord/Administrative%20Order%20%20Defender%20Motions%20for%20Sentence%20Reductions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H7XX-6Y57].
283. See, e.g., General Order 05-15 Re: Social Security Cases (W.D. Wash. June 1, 2015),
https://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/sites/wawd/files/06-01-15GOReSocialSecurityCases.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YF52-3JAV].
284. Compare White v. Swenson, 261 F. Supp. 42 (W.D. Mo. 1966), with Misc. Order No.
13 Establishing a Procedure to Be Followed in Petitions and/or Motions for Post Conviction
Relief (N.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 1977), http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/orders/
misc/MiscOrder13_31877Prisoner.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DZN-7F6P] (order signed by all
district judges). Another option is to establish the framework as a set of substance-specific
local rules, which would presumably trigger notice-and-comment requirements. See, e.g.,
Rules of Practice, U.S. DIST. CT.: DIST. OF UTAH, https://www.utd.uscourts.gov/rules-practice
[https://perma.cc/SV2E-4BJZ] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022) (linking to “Rules Governing
Section 2254 & 2255 Proceedings”).
285. For examples of full en bancs used to address the handling of bankruptcy matters, see
City Fire Equip. Co. v. Ansul Fire Prot. Wormald U.S., Inc., 125 B.R. 645 (N.D. Ala. 1989)
(addressing withdrawal of bankruptcy reference in light of demand for jury trial); In re
Retirement Inn at Forest Lane, Ltd., 83 B.R. 795 (D. Utah 1988) (directing bankruptcy judges
to resolve motions to transfer venue).
286. See, e.g., General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review
of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133 (W.D.
Mo. 1968).
287. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b).
288. See, e.g., Adams v. Chater, 914 F. Supp. 1365, 1369–70 (E.D. La. 1995) (describing
and rejecting litigant challenge to attorney fee schedule adopted “at the monthly en banc
meeting” of the district’s judges).
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of local rulemaking in the 1980s and 1990s. Where district courts seek a
uniform answer to a more precise question, they may be able to use § 1292(b)
to encourage appellate review.
En bancs may nonetheless be a helpful tool when a question will arise
repeatedly in the short term289 or when a district split has already emerged.290
In those circumstances, if interlocutory review is not forthcoming, similarly
situated litigants are at risk of different treatment based on the random chance
of judge assignment.
C. Many Minds
Appellate courts routinely sit as panels on the understanding that many
minds reach better decisions.291 There is an aspect of this “many minds”
rationale in district court en bancs as well, as the resulting decisions
sometimes acknowledge.292 Even when not explicitly stated, however, the
ability to work through a difficult problem with the assistance of colleagues
likely underlies many of these decisions.
First, en banc proceedings can help expose judges to more litigant
perspectives. When the en banc decision involves multiple cases, judges
have access to the briefs and arguments of multiple litigants.293 Judges
convening en banc hearings have also invited participation from additional
289. See, e.g., Greer v. Skilcraft, 704 F. Supp. 1570, 1577 (N.D. Ala. 1989) (resolving
apparent conflict between recently amended statute and prior district practice that affected
more than one hundred pending cases). The constitutionality of the new U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines raised a similar dilemma.
290. Two current procedural issues that have created intradistrict splits, yet largely evade
appellate review, are (1) the permissibility of so-called “snap removal,” see Arthur Hellman
et al., Neutralizing the Stratagem of “Snap Removal”: A Proposed Amendment to the Judicial
Code, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 103, 104–06 (2016); and (2) whether the pleading requirements of
Twombly and Iqbal apply to affirmative defenses, see Brian Soucek & Remington B. Lamons,
Heightened Pleading Standards for Defendants: A Case Study of Court-Counting Precedent,
70 ALA. L. REV. 875, 891–95 (2019). For a rare appellate decision on the latter question, see
GEOMC Co. v. Calmare Therapeutics Inc., 918 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2019). These issues might
thus be appropriate topics for collective proceedings to promote intradistrict uniformity
pending clearer resolution by higher courts.
291. For a summary of the “many minds” argument and a thoughtful analysis of its
applicability to panel decision-making, see Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the
Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 327, 339–43 (2002), in particular id. at 339–43.
See also, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent, 81 U. CHI. L. REV.
851, 863–64 (2014) (summarizing the Condorcet jury theorem); Kim Taylor-Thompson,
Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1272–76 (2000) (drawing on
social science research to link quality of deliberation within juries to correctness in outcome).
292. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Smith v. Warden of Phila. Cnty. Prison, 87 F. Supp.
339, 346 (E.D. Pa. 1949) (opinion of Welsh, J.) (explaining that the assigned judge convened
“a full Bench to get the benefit of the collective wisdom of [his] associates rather than to have
the case decided on the opinion of a single judge”); United States v. Delaney, 8 F. Supp. 224,
225 (D.N.J. 1934) (“We have thought it wise in this district to lend perspective by prescribing
the assistance of a judge other than the one who presided at the trial.”).
293. When consolidating or coordinating a number of cases, districts have designated
multiple “exemplar” cases to be argued before the en banc court, while also allowing the
judges to consider “alternative or additional arguments made by counsel in other cases.”
Skilcraft, 704 F. Supp. at 1572; see also Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1151 (W.D. Wash.
1999).
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interested parties, who may appear as amici.294 The hearings themselves may
be longer.295 And given the unusual nature of the proceeding, litigants may
rise to the occasion by producing particularly thorough briefs.296 As one
judge described, the en banc proceeding was preferable in a difficult set of
cases because, if the judges had heard the cases separately, they “wouldn’t
have [the] benefit of questions someone else asked, [and] wouldn’t have [the]
benefit of super-enhanced brief[s]” that multiple lawyers had helped to
write.297
Second, the development of the collective decision itself will entail
discussion and deliberation, which can in turn improve decision-making.298
Collective decisions do not typically describe the procedure or process used,
at least not in any detail, but interviews with judges who participated in more
recent en bancs are indicative of the collaboration involved in en banc
decisions: there may be conferences before and after oral arguments to
discuss the disposition of the case,299 and drafts of the opinion may be
circulated, with judges offering changes and compromises.300
To the extent that leveraging the many minds of district judges is a benefit
worth pursuing, it is hard to achieve through alternative means. The best
options include informal discussions and statutory three-judge courts, but
both are limited in scope. Instead, the district courts have been encouraged
to leverage their collective wisdom through the accumulation of disparate
opinions, a solution that comes at the expense of judicial economy and
intradistrict uniformity.

294. See, e.g., Phan, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1151 (noting submission of briefs by amici curiae);
United States v. Bogle, 693 F. Supp. 1102, 1104 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (same); see also Ellis v.
Mayor and City Council of Balt., 234 F. Supp. 945, 946 (D. Md. 1964) (noting that the order
convening the panel of judges “was served on a number of potentially interested persons”),
aff’d, 352 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1965); In re Young, 12 F. Supp. 30, 34 (S.D. Ill. 1935) (noting
that interested parties on both sides of the issue were provided opportunity to submit briefs).
295. See Telephone Interview with U.S. District Judge (June 15, 2020) (noting two-hour
hearing).
296. See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 275 F. Supp. 724, 727 n.5 (D. Md. 1967) (“The
Court desires to comment that the cases were carefully, fully and completely presented on
both sides.”), aff’d sub nom. United States v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385 (4th Cir. 1968).
297. Telephone Interview with U.S. District Judge, supra note 295; see also Email from
U.S. District Judge to Maggie Gardner, Assoc. Professor of Law, Cornell L. Sch. (Sept. 2,
2020) (on file with author) (“[I]f there were more sets of lawyers, we could have the benefit
of all they chose to say. We could hear questions from other judges that might not occur to
us.”).
298. See, e.g., Diamond & Zeisel, supra note 84, at 148 (documenting that collective
deliberation among district judges decreased sentencing disparities, albeit modestly).
299. Telephone Interview with U.S. District Judge, supra note 295; Email from U.S.
District Judge to Maggie Gardner, supra note 297.
300. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with U.S. District Judge, supra note 3 (describing a
“group effort” and affirming that “[t]his is the way it should be, an important decision like
that”); Telephone Interview with U.S. District Judge, supra note 94 (noting rounds of edits
and feedback on reasoning of the decision); Email from U.S. District Judge to Maggie
Gardner, Assoc. Professor of Law, Cornell L. Sch. (June 19, 2020) (describing the process
and concluding that “the end result was a modified version of the original draft that all of us
felt comfortable signing on [to]”).
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1. Informal Discussions
Any discussion of institutional mechanisms available to district judges
must acknowledge the reality that judging occurs in a sociological context:
even if district judges generally work independently, they operate within a
collegial environment in which they interact with their peers in a range of
informal to formal settings.301 Annual circuit conferences encourage
socialization, as well as the sharing of best practices.302 A district’s judges
may meet for weekly lunches or monthly meetings,303 or they may more
informally run into colleagues in the hall or stop by each other’s chambers.
Such interactions allow for more informal discussions of procedural
problems, unusual cases, or potential intradistrict splits. Indeed, some district
court en bancs arose out of such routine conversations.304
Such interactions by themselves, however, do not approach the level of
collaboration entailed by most district court en bancs. For one thing, judges
may limit the degree to which they discuss cases (or acknowledge that they
discuss cases) because they are concerned about whether such conversations
are entirely proper or because they jealously guard their independence as
decision-makers. As one judge was quick to emphasize, “I almost never talk
to other judges about issues I’ve got, even if they have a similar one. We
decide our own cases.”305 Further, the sort of thorny issues addressed by
many en banc decisions requires deeper engagement and analysis than an
informal conversation can provide. While conversations and camaraderie are
important, they are not a replacement for truly collaborative efforts.
2. Three-Judge Courts
On the opposite end of the formality spectrum, statutorily mandated
three-judge courts can also promote the epistemic benefits of collective
decision-making. Although this was not the only rationale for requiring
three-judge courts,306 a three-judge court does “ensure[] greater deliberation
with less chance of error or bias.”307 But the use of three-judge courts has
been significantly curtailed since the mid-1970s.308
301. Cf. Levy, supra note 35, at 113 (quoting federal judge who noted that informal
socializing encourages collegiality in both personal interactions and opinion writing).
302. See FISH, supra note 16, at 147–50.
303. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with U.S. District Judge (June 17, 2020) (noting weekly
judges’ lunch); Email from U.S. District Judge to Maggie Gardner, Assoc. Professor of Law,
Cornell L. Sch. (Sept. 3, 2020) (on file with author) (noting weekly judges’ lunch).
304. See Email from U.S. District Judge to Maggie Gardner, Assoc. Professor of Law,
Cornell L. Sch. (June 17, 2020) (on file with author) (noting that the idea for the en banc
hearing arose out of weekly judges’ lunch).
305. Telephone Interview with U.S. District Judge, supra note 295.
306. Another commonly cited justification was the need for greater legitimacy for
controversial federal court decisions, a concern that will be considered in Part III.D.2.
307. Currie, supra note 39, at 7; see also id. at 7–8 (“While it is possible that two judges
out of a panel of three may be mistaken or even prejudiced, it is more possible that a single
judge may be; and if the mistake is an honest one, even one clear-eyed judge among three may
be able to forestall a bad decision.”).
308. See supra Part I.A.2.
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District courts have some leeway, however, in developing their own
three-judge court rules (though limited to the involvement of district judges).
For example, the Northern District of Texas in 2000 convened en banc to
consider reciprocal attorney discipline and referred the matters to a
three-judge panel.309 When similar reciprocal disciplinary matters arose in
2001 and 2002, the en banc court again delegated the matter to a three-judge
panel;310 it then wrote a three-judge panel requirement for reciprocal
disciplinary matters into its local rules.311 Other districts have similarly
adopted local rules requiring a three-judge panel for some attorney discipline
cases,312 while the Northern District of Illinois handles serious disciplinary
matters through a seven-judge “executive committee” established through its
internal operating procedures.313 These panel requirements may reflect a
concern that, when it comes to serious disciplinary action, judges—
particularly those who were affected by the misconduct—may wish to slow
down their decision-making process through collective consideration.314
Outside of the attorney discipline context, however, district courts appear
not to have made much use of three-judge panel requirements. It is perhaps
hard to identify in advance which sets of cases would justify the extra
resources and efforts that collective decision-making would entail. Given
recent debates, one option might be to permit or require three-judge panels
for cases in which the plaintiff seeks a so-called “nationwide” injunction.315
Another option might be to make the invocation of three-judge panels
optional for all cases, based on the request of the assigned judge and with the
approval of the chief judge or a majority of the district’s judges.316
3. Percolation
En bancs seek to harness “many minds” through a single, synchronous
decision, but the epistemic value of collective decision-making can also be

309. See In re Smith, 100 F. Supp. 2d 412 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
310. See In re Wightman-Cervantes, 236 F. Supp. 2d 618 (N.D. Tex. 2002); In re McTighe,
131 F. Supp. 2d 870 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
311. See N.D. TEX. LR 83.8(h)(iii); see also In re Wightman-Cervantes, 236 F. Supp. 2d at
620 n.1 (describing the development of this practice and local rule).
312. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Regarding Doe, 876 F. Supp. 265 (M.D. Fla.
1993) (applying three-judge panel rule); In re Cintolo, No. MBD 85-564, 1996 WL 464047
(D. Mass. July 11, 1996) (applying local three-judge panel rule to consider reinstatement of
attorney to the bar).
313. N.D. ILL. IOP1, IOP2; N.D. ILL. R. 3.51.D; see also In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 485
(7th Cir. 1995) (approving of the district’s handling of disciplinary matters via executive
committee).
314. See Telephone Interview with U.S. District Judge, supra note 94; E.D. PA. R. 83.6
R.V(B) (specifying a three-judge panel requirement when an attorney discipline hearing is
“predicated upon the complaint of a judge of this court”).
315. Cf. Gregg Costa, An Old Solution to the Nationwide Injunction Problem, HARV. L
REV. BLOG (Jan. 25, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/an-old-solution-to-thenationwide-injunction-problem/ [https://perma.cc/7GQQ-GS46] (suggesting statutory
three-judge court model could be used for nationwide injunctions).
316. For further discussion, see infra Part IV.C.
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pursued through sequential decisions by independent judges.317 Particularly
when it comes to lower courts, numerous decisions addressing the same
question may help reviewing courts identify not only epistemically correct
answers, but also answers that are pragmatically wise and broadly
acceptable.318 As Professor Michael Coenen and Seth Davis have recently
explained, this valuing of district court “percolation” on legal questions rose
to prominence in the twentieth century,319 coinciding with the decline of
intra-court comity.
That inverse relationship is not surprising as percolation valorizes the
fragmentation of the district courts’ voice. As Coenen and Davis argue,
percolation comes at the expense of inconsistency in the treatment of
litigants, even though its benefits can be achieved through other means.320
While not among the alternative means discussed by Coenen and Davis,
district court en bancs are one such alternative: they can provide many of the
benefits of percolation while reducing inconsistency in individual treatment.
One perceived benefit of percolation is the collating of different factual
circumstances in which a legal question can arise, but en bancs can also
achieve that factual collation when multiple exemplar cases are considered
together.321 And in lieu of simply crowdsourcing district judges’ analyses
across cases, district court en bancs enable active deliberation among district
judges—deliberation that is especially valuable when an issue is either
shielded from appellate review or is one in which the district court has
particular expertise.
To the extent percolation is worth promoting, however, it can be pursued
alongside collective proceedings and intra-court comity: when percolation
is paired with collective proceedings, the benefit of many minds is leveraged
both within and across districts, maintaining uniformity within districts
without foreclosing potentially helpful variation across districts.322

317. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 198, at 111 (noting the Condorcet Jury Theorem can
apply to both simultaneous and sequential decision-making).
318. See Bruhl, supra note 291, at 861–77 (considering reasons why the Supreme Court
might be interested in the collective wisdom of district court decisions).
319. Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Percolation’s Value, 73 STAN. L. REV. 363, 371–72
(2021).
320. See generally id.
321. See supra note 293 (gathering examples).
322. The debate over the constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provides an
excellent example of such “percolation” across districts, despite the use of collective decisions
within individual districts that prevented significant sentencing disparities between defendants
sentenced within the same courthouse. See supra Part II.C.
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D. Legitimacy
Group decisions—especially if unanimous—are often perceived as more
legitimate,323 or at least exude greater gravitas.324 District courts have used
en bancs to signal the seriousness with which they are taking issues of great
local importance.325 Speaking with one voice may serve to educate a key
audience,326 reduce future challenges,327 or simply avoid any one judge
having to take sole responsibility for a difficult or high-stakes decision.328

323. See, e.g., Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens’ Perceptions of
the Criminal Jury: Procedural Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
333, 338–39 (1988) (finding that survey respondents considered unanimous twelve-person
jury verdicts to be more accurate, fairer, and less biased than nonunanimous jury verdicts,
six-person jury verdicts, or rulings by judges).
324. Chief Justice John Marshall famously moved the Supreme Court from seriatim
opinions to collective decisions in order to increase the “weight and dignity,” and thus the
political power, of the Court. M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back
Again: A Theory of Dissent 24 (John M. Olin Program in L. and Econ., Working Paper No.
363, 2007).
325. See, e.g., Yoerg Brewing Co. v. Brennan, 59 F. Supp. 625, 625 (D. Minn. 1945) (“The
question raised being deemed highly important and novel, the Judges of this District sat en
banc.”); Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Odell, 45 F.2d 180, 181 (E.D. Mich. 1930) (noting “the cause
being of major importance” as the reason for convening a voluntary three-judge court); Schiff
v. Hannah, 282 F. Supp. 381, 382 (W.D. Mich. 1966) (“This matter is being considered by the
Judges of this Court, sitting en banc, because of the importance of the questions
involved . . . .”); see also City Declares Its Right to Regulate, OREGONIAN, Sept. 27, 1912, at
9 (reporting that, “[w]ith evident full appreciation of the immense importance of the injunction
suit[,] United States District Judge [Robert S.] Bean requested that his associate, Judge Charles
E. Wolverton, sit with him during the argument and join with him in its decision”). For the
resulting joint decisions by Judges Bean and Wolverton, see Portland Ry., Light & Power Co.
v. City of Portland, 200 F. 890 (D. Or. 1912); Portland Ry., Light & Power Co. v. City of
Portland, 201 F. 119 (D. Or. 1912).
326. Some of the collective decisions in asbestos cases, for example, sent clear signals to
defendants that the judges were unified in their decision to consolidate cases or reject a
common defense. See In re All Asbestos Cases Pending in the U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of
Md., No. BML-1, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10719 (D. Md. Dec. 16, 1983); In re Asbestos Litig.,
628 F. Supp. 774 (D.N.J. 1986), aff’d, 829 F.2d 1233 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Keatley v. Food
Lion, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D. Va. 1989) (denying out-of-time demands for jury trials by
two judges and gathering all of the other cases in which the same attorney had made the same
mistake). United States v. Wallace, 222 F. Supp. 485 (M.D. Ala. 1963) (per curiam), used
collective proceedings to add extra weight to an injunction directed against state officials,
while Conley v. Lake Charles School Board, 303 F. Supp. 394 (W.D. La. 1969) (per curiam),
used collective proceedings to express disagreement with the Fifth Circuit’s direction to take
meaningful action towards desegregating schools.
327. See, e.g., Angle v. Legislature of the State of Nev., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1154
(D. Nev. 2003) (noting the likelihood of additional cases as justifying en banc proceedings),
aff’d sub nom. Amodei v. Nev. State Senate, 99 F. App’x 90 (9th Cir. 2004); Telephone
Interview with U.S. District Judge, supra note 3 (explaining that a collective decision would
“put the cork in the bottle” of future complaints).
328. See Recent Case, supra note 15, at 133 (“The desire of a judge to avoid sole
responsibility especially in bankruptcy and other matters involving large amounts may be the
explanation of this procedure [of deciding cases collectively].”). This was apparently the
reason extra judges were assigned for a time in the school desegregation litigation in Detroit.
See supra note 159 and accompanying text. It also factored into Chief Justice Marshall’s
decision to move from seriatim to collective opinions. See Henderson, supra note 324, at 27
(noting that the collective opinions “carried greater authority, and individual justices were
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The ceremonial nature of the en banc hearing itself can signal the seriousness
with which the court is treating the matter and the weightiness of any
subsequent decision.329 As one judge put it, for these cases, “the procedure
[is] as important as the decision itself.”330
Collective proceedings also allow district judges to act as a unified court
on matters of institutional integrity.331 For example, district courts have used
full en bancs to address particularly serious misconduct allegations against
members of their bar.332 They have also used full en bancs to protect the
integrity of their grand juries: the District of Nebraska sat en banc in 1976
to consider requests for the release of grand jury testimony regarding corrupt
local officials,333 and nine judges of the Eastern District of New York held
an en banc hearing in 1988—attended by nearly 200 spectators—to consider
whether the U.S. Attorney had misused grand jury proceedings in order to
provoke a mistrial in a mob trial.334 For an example straddling these
concerns, consider the Eastern District of Arkansas’s en banc decision to
dismiss an ethics complaint lodged against Kenneth Starr for his handling of
the district’s grand jury in the Whitewater investigation.335
En bancs, by allowing district courts to speak with one weightier voice,
can also serve as a form of both interbranch and intrabranch dialogue. In
terms of Congress, Professor Ahmed Taha has argued that the use of en banc
decisions in the Guidelines cases may have been strategic, given that districts
that issued collective decisions were more likely to find the Guidelines
unconstitutional than districts that issued individual opinions.336 Recall also

shielded from outrage or impeachment charges”); id. at 17 (noting Thomas Jefferson’s
opposition to the shift because it “insulated any single justice from criticism”).
329. Telephone Interview with U.S. District Judge (June 19, 2020) (noting that interested
parties were impressed by the special nature of the hearing).
330. Telephone Interview with U.S. District Judge, supra note 3.
331. See generally Pfander, supra note 237 (documenting the historical distinction between
the work of individual judges and collective administrative decisions taken on behalf of the
court).
332. See, e.g., In re Tyler, 677 F. Supp. 1410 (D. Neb. 1987); In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp.
360 (E.D. Va. 1967); In re Bennethum, 205 F. Supp. 821 (D. Del. 1962); In re Schachne, 5 F.
Supp. 680 (E.D.N.Y. 1934).
333. See United States v. Salanitro, 437 F. Supp. 240 (D. Neb. 1977), aff’d, In re Disclosure
of Testimony Before Grand Jury, 580 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1978).
334. United States v. Ruggiero, 846 F.2d 117, 121–22 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting hearing); see
also Leonard Buder, In Rare Session, 9 U.S. Judges Convene to Review Mob Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 1988, at A1 (listing participating judges, including Chief Judge Jack B.
Weinstein, Judge John R. Bartels, and Judge Mark A. Constantino, who was presiding over
the mob trial). Judge Bartels later characterized this proceeding as an example of an en banc
proceeding being motivated by “the desire to assist a fellow judge in particularly serious
cases.” Bartels, supra note 15, at 41 n.13. He worried, however, that it might have resulted in
an advisory opinion to the extent that the panel left the ultimate question of whether to declare
a mistrial to Judge Constantino. Id. at 41. I have not included this case in the appendix as I
have not been able to locate a decision, despite Judge Bartels’s reference to one.
335. In re Starr, 986 F. Supp. 1159, 1163 (E.D. Ark. 1997).
336. See Taha, supra note 15, at 1235.
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that a few district courts similarly used collective proceedings in the 1930s
to declare New Deal legislation unconstitutional.337
Other cases have involved district courts pushing back against executive
power. The Northern District of Illinois in 1924 held en banc that the
President could not pardon criminal contempt because it would usurp the
essential authority of the courts338 (though the Supreme Court ultimately
disagreed339), and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1932 held en banc
that it did not have to automatically issue a bench warrant upon a grand jury’s
indictment340 (again, the Supreme Court disagreed341). It is perhaps notable
that these decisions came during a period of tension between the executive
branch and the lower federal courts, which were chafing under the
administrative oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice. That tension
eased once oversight of the courts was moved in 1939 to the newly
established Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.342 More recently, the
five-judge decision in Phan v. Reno343 similarly signaled to the executive
branch the strength of the judges’ concerns regarding the government’s
policy of indefinite detention of noncitizens awaiting deportation.
But sometimes the intended audience of the en banc decision is a higher
court. Occasionally, this message has been explicit, like the Western District
of Louisiana’s use of en banc decisions to make clear its disagreement with
the Fifth Circuit regarding school desegregation plans.344 Consider also two
collective decisions from the District of Maryland from the same period: in
the first decision, all five of the district’s judges ordered U.S. Customs to
release magazines seized as obscene, citing recent First Amendment
precedents.345 Two of the participating judges issued another joint opinion
the following year, applying the same framework to order the release of even
more prurient magazines.346 Both opinions were clear about their distaste
for the seized materials.347 But the later opinion was more explicit about the

337. See, e.g., In re Schoenleber, 13 F. Supp. 375 (D. Neb. 1936); In re Young, 12 F. Supp.
30 (S.D. Ill. 1935); Gold Medal Foods, Inc. v. Landy, 11 F. Supp. 65 (D. Minn. 1935).
338. United States v. Grossman, 1 F.2d 941 (N.D. Ill. 1924).
339. See generally Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
340. United States v. Wingert, 55 F.2d 960 (E.D. Pa. 1932). The court noted, however,
that its decision to sit en banc—and perhaps its decision to quash the indictment, as a means
of creating a final judgment—was intended to encourage and enable appellate review. Id. at
963; see also id. (“If, however, there is no way of raising the question by appellate review
other than by mandamus, we express our entire willingness to have it so raised.”).
341. See generally Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241 (1932).
342. See FISH, supra note 16, at 91–124.
343. 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
344. See supra Part II.B.
345. United States v. 4,400 Copies of Mags., Entitled “Cover Girl” & “Exciting,” 276 F.
Supp. 902, 904 (D. Md. 1967) (per curiam).
346. United States v. 127,295 Copies of Mags., More or Less, Entitled “Amor,” 295 F.
Supp. 1186, 1188–89 (D. Md. 1968).
347. 127,295 Copies of Mags., 295 F. Supp. at 1188 (“It is incredible that those who
adopted the First Amendment intended that it should license purveyors of filth to flood the
country with the kind of material now held protected.”); 4,400 Copies of Mags., 276 F. Supp.
at 903 (“The magazines involved in the present case are lewder than any magazines heretofore
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lower courts’ confusion following the Supreme Court’s recent case law and
was more emphatic about the harm it had caused.348 Nonetheless, once it
had made its views known, the court—like the Western District of Louisiana
in the school desegregation cases—concluded that “the duty of the inferior
federal courts is to apply, as best we can, the standards the Supreme Court
has decreed with respect to obscenity.”349
More often, however, the message to higher courts has been left implicit.
Judges with whom I spoke, for example, were cognizant that their decision
to sit en banc would “chill the enthusiasm” of appellate courts to get
involved, or at least that the resulting decision would carry “more force” on
review.350
1. Opinion Writing
Almost everything a judge does is intended to project the legitimacy of her
judgments, from the wearing of robes to the provision of rationales for
decisions. Collective decisions project a certain type of legitimacy by
representing the unified institutional voice of the court. Although individual
judges cannot precisely replicate the signal sent by a collective decision, they
can use the rhetoric and style of opinion writing to increase the stature of the
district court vis-à-vis other government actors. For example, a judge who
authors a 200-page decision filled with citations raises the cost of an appellate
court disagreeing with him. Judges can cite prior decisions from within the
district to show unity in approach to a common problem or to reinforce a
lesson directed at a specific litigant (colloquially referred to as a
“benchslap”351). They can also employ dicta or emotional rhetoric to
criticize law or precedent that they nonetheless feel compelled to apply.
Judges use these rhetorical moves intuitively, but they are not entirely
costless. Besides the resources consumed by the writing (and reading) of
lengthy opinions, excessive use of citations for persuasive effect can distort
the common-law development of doctrines.352 And at a time when individual
judges—and their decisions—are quickly associated with their appointing
President, single-authored decisions on controversial or high-stakes cases

considered by this Court . . . , appeal more blatantly to the prurient interest of the average man
or boy, and go further beyond the prevailing standards of candor. They have no social value.”).
348. 127,295 Copies of Mags., 295 F. Supp. at 1188 (“As was to be expected, the
successive decisions by the Supreme Court have emboldened the purveyors of pornography
to import magazines which go further and further beyond the prevailing standards in this
country.”).
349. Id.
350. Telephone Interview with U.S. District Judge, supra note 303.
351. See, e.g., Joe Patrice, Wal-Mart Benchslapped in Epic String Cite, ABOVE THE LAW
(Oct. 11, 2018, 4:02 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/10/wal-mart-benchslapped-in-epicstring-cite [https://perma.cc/J6VQ-XQPS] (describing “nuclear string cite” in Rivera v. Sam’s
Club Humacao, 386 F. Supp. 3d 188 (D.P.R. 2018), in which the judge gathered eighteen prior
cases, including fifteen district court opinions, in which the same defendant had been
sanctioned for spoliation).
352. See Gardner, supra note 253.
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may never be able to overcome the shadow of politicization.353 Some cases
may call for greater markers of legitimacy than even the most erudite opinion
can provide.
2. Three-Judge Courts, Redux
This brings us back to the other rationale for three-judge courts: the added
legitimacy of having multiple judges agree to the imposition of a
controversial remedy. While it seemed offensive that “one little federal
judge” could block the collective will of a state’s governor, legislature, and
attorney general following Ex Parte Young, “if three judges declare that a
state statute is unconstitutional[,] the people would rest easy under it.”354 Put
another way, “[t]hree judges lend the dignity required to make such a
decision palatable.”355
That intuition spilled over into the practice of district court en bancs, with
some voluntary collective proceedings being self-consciously modeled on
statutory three-judge courts.356 It is possible that the statutory repeals of the
primary three-judge court requirements removed an important institutional
model for collective adjudication, decreasing district judges’ awareness of
and willingness to engage in joint decision-making. Regardless, statutory
three-judge courts today provide very little scope for collective adjudication
at the district court level, leaving district judges with few options for
bolstering the legitimacy of deeply considered yet potentially controversial
decisions.
In sum, district judges today have alternative mechanisms to promote
judicial economy and intradistrict uniformity, but the decline of statutory
three-judge courts has left them with fewer options for leveraging collective
deliberation and enhancing the legitimacy of difficult or controversial
decisions. Note that these needs—economy, consistency, deliberation, and
legitimacy—roughly correlate with the different formats of collective district
353. See Bert I. Huang, Judicial Credibility, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1053, 1060 (2020)
(summarizing findings that the public’s assessment of judicial credibility in high-profile cases
is influenced by the association of the judge with the judge’s appointing president).
354. Currie, supra note 39, at 7 & n.40 (quoting Senator Overman); see also Morley, supra
note 36, at 728 (quoting Senator Overman as explaining that “[t]he people and the courts of
the State are more inclined to abide by the decision of three judges than they would of one
subordinate inferior Federal judge . . . “); id. at 735 (quoting President Franklin D. Roosevelt
and others regarding the need for such procedures).
355. Currie, supra note 39, at 7.
356. See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 275 F. Supp. 724, 728 (D. Md. 1967) (noting that
while a three-judge court was not required by statute, the Chief Judge would convene a district
court panel voluntarily in light of similarly important stakes), aff’d, United States v.
DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385 (4th Cir. 1968); Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Odell, 45 F.2d 180, 181
(E.D. Mich. 1930) (noting that while there was “no legal requirement for the convening of a
statutory court,” the case was nonetheless heard “before the three judges of the district” given
that “the cause [was] of major importance”); see also Renton Line Fight to Be Heard Again,
SEATTLE STAR, July 11, 1914, at 3 (noting that the three-judge court was being disbanded but
that two local district judges would continue to consider the case). For the resulting two-judge
decision in the Renton Line case, see Seattle, R. & S. Ry. Co. v. City of Seattle, 216 F. 694
(W.D. Wash. 1914).
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court proceedings—coordinated decisions, adopted decisions, panels, and
full en bancs. As more tools have developed for consolidating civil litigation,
for example, the need for ad hoc coordinated decisions in civil cases has
largely disappeared. To the extent that intradistrict uniformity is valued—
for example, to establish consistent treatment of recurrent procedural
questions that evade appellate review—occasional adopted decisions may be
well-suited to establish it in a resource-efficient manner. But if the greatest
remaining need for collective proceedings is deliberation and legitimacy, that
is best achieved through panels and full en bancs. In considering the future
of district court en bancs, then, the next part focuses primarily on the use of
panels and full en banc proceedings.
IV. THE FUTURE OF DISTRICT COURT EN BANCS
The use of voluntary collective adjudication by district courts has been
extremely rare in relation to the scale of the district courts’ dockets. The
decisions gathered in the appendix make no mention of local rules, and no
district currently appears to have a local rule addressing en banc
proceedings.357 At times, collective decisions have acknowledged other
district court en bancs358 or have been clustered in a single district,359
suggesting a transmission process from one case to the next, perhaps under
the advocacy of a particular judge. But other times it appears that a decision
to decide a case collectively arose organically.360 Indeed, multiple judges
with whom I spoke were surprised to learn that other judges had ever done
something similar.361
The goal of this part is not to stimulate a greater frequency of district court
en bancs. Collective proceedings are time and resource intensive, and their
overuse could undermine the values they are meant to promote. Frequent
invocation might sow rancor or discord among a district’s judges, for
357. It is possible, however, that district courts have had such local rules in the past. See In
re Gaylor, 123 B.R. 236, 242 n.9 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991) (referencing local rules regarding
en banc procedures for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of Oklahoma). The
Western District of Oklahoma currently has a local rule allowing its bankruptcy judges to sit
en banc. BANKR. W.D. OKLA. R. 7052-1.
358. See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Vasquez, 759 F. Supp. 1467, 1469 n.2 (E.D. Cal. 1991); Dondi
Props. Corp. v. Com. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 286 (N.D. Tex. 1988); United States
v. Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff’d, United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d
1272 (11th Cir. 1982).
359. In addition to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s notable tradition of en bancs,
consider the five en banc decisions issued by the District of Utah in the mid-1980s and the
five en banc decisions issued by the District of Maryland in the 1960s. See Appendix. Judges
Matthew M. Joyce and Gunnar Nordbye of the District of Minnesota participated in at least
five decisions together in the 1930s and 1940s, including one that they issued jointly as visiting
judges in the District of North Dakota. See In re Anderson, 22 F. Supp. 928 (D.N.D. 1938).
360. For examples of decisions that explicitly discuss their collective nature but make no
reference to other district court en bancs, see Angle v. Legislature of the State of Nev., 274 F.
Supp. 2d 1152, 1154 (D. Nev. 2003), aff’d sub nom. Amodei v. Nev. State Senate, 99 F. App’x
90 (9th Cir. 2004); Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1151 (W.D. Wash. 1999); United
States v. State of Haw., 564 F. Supp. 189, 195 n.9 (D. Haw. 1983).
361. Telephone Interview with U.S. District Judge, supra note 3; Telephone Interview with
U.S. District Judge, supra note 329.
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instance or signal to the public that single-judge decisions are by implication
less legitimate. Rather, the goal here is to link past practice to future use: to
map the outer limits of the courts’ authority to decide cases collaboratively
and to identify best practices so that future judges need not repeat lessons
already learned.
A. The Limits of District Court En Bancs
While en banc proceedings are a legitimate exercise of the district courts’
inherent authority,362 that authority is not boundless. According to the
Supreme Court, (1) “an inherent power cannot be contrary to any express rule
or statute,”363 (2) an inherent power “must be a reasonable response to a
specific problem,”364 and (3) a court in exercising its inherent power “must
comply with the mandates of due process,”365 meaning that the process is fair
for those who will be affected by it. Taking these three (admittedly vague)
limits as guideposts, this section develops a set of best practices and
considerations for future en bancs.
1. Conforming with Existing Legal Rules
As Part I.B established, district courts have much discretion to organize
their business as they see fit. Still, the Supreme Court’s warning that inherent
powers should not contradict existing law can serve as a more general
reminder that inherent powers should remain interstitial.
One question on which statutory law suggests caution is the role of senior
judges in full en banc decisions. The statute establishing the district courts
provides that “[e]ach district court shall consist of the district judge or judges
for the district in regular active service.”366 To the extent that a collective
decision speaks for the district as a whole, one could argue that the court for
which it speaks is comprised only of “judges for the district in regular active
service.”367 That would also mirror the explicit decision Congress has made
to limit appellate court en bancs to judges in regular active service, unless the
senior judge was assigned to the initial panel.368
Nonetheless, the statutory language is not entirely clear and Congress has
not directly addressed the question. Given the centrality of senior judges to
the work of many districts,369 individual districts might opt to invoke the
flexibility of 28 U.S.C. §§ 132(c) and 137(a) in assigning senior judges to en
362. See supra Part I.B.
363. Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 45–46 (2016).
364. Id.
365. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991).
366. 28 U.S.C. § 132(b).
367. See id.
368. Id. § 46(c); see also United States v. Am.-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 685–86
(1960) (interpreting “active service” judges as excluding senior judges who still hear cases).
369. See Stephen B. Burbank et al., Leaving the Bench, 1970–2009: The Choices Federal
Judges Make, What Influences Those Choices, and Their Consequences, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 91–98 (2012) (documenting the critical importance of senior judges in carrying the
workload of the federal courts).
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banc panels.370 Further, this potential limitation applies primarily to full en
bancs; there is no similar doubt that senior judges should participate in
coordinated decisions based on initial case assignments or that they may join
adopted decisions to signal their individual views.
2. Addressing a Specific Problem
The concern that an inherent power “must be a reasonable response to a
specific problem”371 again emphasizes the interstitial nature of such powers.
Especially when paired with the Supreme Court’s call for “restraint” when
exercising inherent powers,372 this guidepost suggests that judges should
invoke their inherent power only when no other available tools will suffice.
Districts might thus consider whether other congressionally authorized
avenues, such as § 1292(b) appeals or local rulemaking, can address their
concerns before initiating en banc proceedings.
It also suggests that courts should articulate their rationales for doing so.
In the appellate context, for instance, the federal rules indicate that an en banc
hearing “ordinarily will not be ordered” unless it is necessary to ensure circuit
uniformity or if “the proceeding involves a question of exceptional
importance.”373 Collective district court adjudication should not serve to
duplicate or replace appeals; thus, the guiding question should be whether
the district court acting collectively can serve a purpose that cannot be
achieved through an appellate decision. Such circumstances might include:
(1) issues that implicate the integrity of the district court as an institution, (2)
issues that are likely to arise in multiple cases in the short term before
appellate review can be obtained, (3) issues that will evade appellate review
over the longer term, (4) instances in which collective proceedings can
significantly conserve judicial resources, or (5) issues that are of exceptional
local importance, such that the district court’s closer connection to local
government and citizenry makes it an especially suitable body to hear the
case collectively.374
Whatever the rationales deemed sufficient to justify collective
proceedings, they should be specified in any local rule authorizing them.
Judges also should explicitly invoke the relevant rationale both in any order
coordinating cases or convening an en banc hearing (in order to inform the
parties) and in the resulting decision (in order to inform the public).

370. The Western District of Missouri, for example, already defines the court “en banc” as
consisting of “all district judges assigned to the District, including judges on senior status.”
W.D. MO. R. 1.1.
371. Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 46 (2016).
372. Id. at 48 (“Because the exercise of an inherent power in the interest of promoting
efficiency may risk undermining other vital interests related to the fair administration of
justice, a district court’s inherent powers must be exercised with restraint.”).
373. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(2).
374. Cf. Bartels, supra note 15, at 42 (emphasizing the commonality of issues, uniformity
in the treatment of litigants, conservation of resources, and particularly serious issues).
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3. Ensuring Fairness
District court en bancs can affect the interests of both the litigants currently
before the court and those who may be in the future. Current litigants should
receive fair notice of the collective proceedings in order to conform their
litigation strategy appropriately. A best practice would be to consult with the
parties regarding the decision to take the case en banc, or, if that is not
possible, at least to collaborate with the parties in scheduling briefs and
hearings.375 Judges should also participate in the hearing if they intend to
participate in the decision, a requirement that ensures that parties have an
opportunity to be heard by all those with a say in the disposition of their case.
Of course, future litigants are routinely affected by the binding law made
in appellate cases. But basic institutional mechanisms of the courts of
appeals help broaden the perspective of the judges in any one particular case,
such as the use of panel decision-making and the opportunity for amici
participation. Those same mechanisms can be deployed by district courts
when they act collectively. Past district court en bancs have invited amici
briefs and selected exemplar cases (sometimes chosen in consultation with
counsel), ensuring that the judges are aware of the diversity of circumstances
in which a problem may arise.376
To the extent that future litigants are expected to follow en banc decisions
as a matter of district custom, they must have advance notice of them. This
notice requirement flows from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83(b)’s
limitation that no sanctions can be imposed on a party for failing to comply
with “any requirement [set by a district judge] not in federal law, federal
rules, or the local rules unless the alleged violator has been furnished in the
particular case with actual notice of the requirement.”377 Even if judges do
not intend to impose sanctions for noncompliance, publicizing en banc
decisions will increase conformity and thus the consistency that the judges
may be seeking. Districts may thus wish to post all collective decisions on
their websites, alongside rules and orders.378
For an example of a collective proceeding that successfully navigated all
of these concerns, consider the Western District of Washington’s decision in
Phan v. Reno regarding the indefinite detention of noncitizens who could not
be deported to their home countries: whether the rights of an individual
habeas petitioner were violated might turn on the crime for which the
petitioner was being deported, the country to which the petitioner was
supposed to be deported, and the length of time the petitioner had already

375. See, e.g., Movement Against Destruction v. Volpe, 361 F. Supp. 1360, 1367 (D. Md.
1973); Prentiss v. Nat’l Airlines, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 306, 307 (D.N.J. 1953) (noting the
agreement of counsel that the two judges would consider the cases together).
376. See supra notes 293–94 (collecting examples).
377. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b).
378. The Northern District of Texas, for example, still posts a copy of its Dondi decision
on its website, though not under the “Rules & Orders” tab. See Resources, U.S. DIST. CT.: N.
DIST. OF TEX., http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/resources [https://perma.cc/X2DX-XV7G] (last
visited Feb. 2, 2022).
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been detained.379 Rather than have one joint decision resolve more than one
hundred petitions on behalf of five different judges, the judges of the Seattle
division picked five exemplar cases—one from each of their dockets—to be
briefed and argued before the five-judge bench.380 The chief judge then
authored a joint order, setting out the legal framework for analyzing these
claims, which was followed by short orders resolving each of the exemplar
cases.381 The joint order directed, for the remaining petitions, an expedited
briefing schedule in light of the joint decision.382 There is much to commend
in this process. The joint decision carefully considered a range of factual
permutations and the perspectives of different interested parties. While
agreeing on the legal reasoning set forth in the joint order, the judges retained
their discretion to apply that reasoning to their individually assigned cases.
And all petitioners were provided an opportunity to respond to that collective
decision, as was the U.S. government in regard to each habeas petitioner. In
other words, while the collective decision was treated as presumptively
correct, it did not claim precedential force over the remaining habeas
petitions.
To summarize, the limits on the district courts’ inherent powers suggest
that collective proceedings not explicitly authorized by Congress should only
be invoked in the absence of alternative mechanisms for achieving the same
benefits, be explicitly justified, provide advance notice to litigants, include
active deliberation by all participating judges, seek broad input from
interested parties, and be made publicly available.
B. Practical Considerations
As these considerations begin to suggest, collective proceedings—
particularly full en bancs and panel decisions—are logistically challenging
and costly.383 They require significant investment of judicial time and
attention. Full en banc hearings in particular can be expensive and difficult
to execute: in geographically dispersed districts, judges may have to travel
in order to sit together, increasing both costs and disruption of other judicial
work;384 for district courts that do not have access to an appellate en banc
courtroom or that have many judges, there is also the practical problem of
attempting to arrange a full bench sitting in a too-small courtroom.385 While
more options for convening remotely may have surfaced through the courts’

379. See Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1155–56 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (describing
factors to be weighed in individual petitions).
380. Id. at 1151.
381. See id. at 1158; see also Phan v. Smith, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1158 (1999) (“appl[ying]
the legal framework set forth in the Joint Order to the facts of petitioner Phan’s case” (footnote
omitted)).
382. Phan, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1158.
383. Adopted decisions may avoid many of these expenses but at the potential cost of
fairness to litigants.
384. Telephone Interview with U.S. District Judge, supra note 3.
385. Id. (noting the difficulty of arranging for an en banc hearing in a district court
courtroom).
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experience with the pandemic, such practical concerns further suggest that
collective proceedings by district courts should be rare and carefully
justified.
Thus, while Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 permits parties to
petition for rehearing en banc,386 there is less need for—and more difficulty
caused by—allowing litigants to propose district court en bancs. On the one
hand, district court litigants still have an opportunity to appeal as of right;
those who petition for rehearing en banc at the appellate level, in contrast,
are unlikely to receive any additional review of their cause, whether through
an appellate en banc or a Supreme Court grant of certiorari. On the other
hand, litigant interest in district court en banc proceedings would likely far
exceed the capacity or interest of the district courts to convene them,
generating extra work for district judges left to deny litigant requests.387
Indeed, district judges have often, and sharply, rejected out of hand litigant
requests for district court en bancs.388
Instead, proposals to convene a full en banc should be initiated solely by
the assigned judge.389 This limitation prevents other judges from calling for
a collective proceeding in order to effectively remove a colleague from a
controversial case, shunting that judge to a powerless dissent.390 By leaving
the question instead to the (randomly) assigned judge, the call for a vote
relates not to whether the initiating judge will be allowed to decide the case,
but whether the initiating judge will receive the assistance of colleagues in
resolving it.
Once proposed, the decision to convene a panel or the full en banc court
could be made by the chief judge or could be taken by the court as a whole.

386. FED. R. APP. P. 35(b). Nonetheless, the advisory committee notes for Rule 35 make
clear that parties can only propose the en banc rehearing; the decision whether to call a vote
on the matter is left to the judges. See id. advisory committee notes to 1967 amendments.
387. As Justice Frankfurter cautioned in the appellate context, allowing litigants to request
en banc rehearings will encourage the filing of such motions as a matter of course, which “is
an abuse of judicial energy[,] . . . results in needless delay[, and] . . . arouses false hopes in
defeated litigants and wastes their money.” W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S.
247, 270 (1953).
388. See United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 96 F. Supp. 100, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (“[W]e
denied the respondent’s petition to convene a full bench. We have never granted such a
petition. It has been done only, on a few occasions, at the request of the Judge to whom the
matter was originally assigned.”); see also, e.g., Crommelin v. Woodfield, No. 95-8697-CIV,
1998 WL 188101, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 1998) (rejecting plaintiff’s “unorthodox request”
for an en banc panel); Coker v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., No. 737-71-N, 1972 WL
28913, at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 17, 1972) (rejecting plaintiff’s request to convene en banc court
because “we know of no rule or statute permitting or requiring the convening of a district court
en banc for any purpose”); id. (“It is true that certain multi-judge courts centrally located
sometimes act jointly in various matters, but such a procedure is at the option of the judges
and not a matter of right vested in any party.”).
389. This limitation would differ from the appellate practice, which allows the vote to be
called by any judge. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(f) (“A vote need not be taken to determine whether
the case will be heard or reheard en banc unless a judge calls for a vote.”).
390. On the risk of appellate court en bancs being used to overturn judges in the court’s
ideological minority, see Neal Devins & Allison Orr Larsen, Weaponizing En Banc, 96 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1373, 1427 (2021).
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Districts might even require a consensus for full en bancs given the unusual
burden they impose on the court. In terms of who participates, larger districts
may need to adopt a procedure—like the one sanctioned for the largest
appellate courts391—for randomly selecting a subset of the district’s judges
to sit en banc.392 Another alternative for making such proceedings more
manageable would be to delegate the hearing and decision to a panel of
judges. The danger of such ad hoc panels is that they invite selection bias in
the choice of participating judges (which indeed may have been part of their
purpose in the past).393 If the goal of the panel proceeding is to speak for the
district as a whole, the selection of the panel should follow the district’s
standard procedure for assigning cases by lot.
C. En Banc Rules?
That leaves the question of whether district courts should adopt local rules
formalizing such proceedings.
The reasons for codification are
well-canvassed in the literature and deeply ingrained within our legal culture:
procedures established in advance provide transparency in expectations,
predictability in application, and equality of treatment.394 Ex ante
rulemaking also ensures procedures are defined behind a veil of ignorance,
without the distorting specifics of a particular dispute.395 Rulemaking in this
instance would have the added benefit of distilling and memorializing best
practices from the highly variable examples of past cases. Indeed, in the
context of appellate en bancs, the Supreme Court has emphasized the need
for clear procedures for the benefit of both litigants and judges.396
But there are also costs to codification, starting with the actual cost of
formulating and adopting rules for a procedure that will be rarely used.
391. Congress has provided that “[a]ny court of appeals having more than 15 active judges
may . . . perform its en banc function by such number of members of its en banc courts as may
be prescribed by rule of the court of appeals.” Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633
(1978) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)). Currently the Fifth (17), Sixth (16), and
Ninth (29) Circuits have more than fifteen judges, but only the Ninth Circuit has adopted such
a procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 44. By comparison, seven districts currently have more than
fifteen judgeships. See id. § 133 (listing the number of judgeships by district).
392. For example, the Ninth Circuit has implemented 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)’s invitation
through a local rule that provides that “[t]he en banc court . . . shall consist of the Chief Judge
of this circuit and 10 additional judges to be drawn by lot from the active judges of the Court”
(though it also includes the caveat that “[i]n appropriate cases, the Court may order a rehearing
by the full court following a hearing or rehearing en banc”). 9TH CIR. R. 35-3.
393. Recall that some of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania panels were apparently
convened to resolve or avoid brewing intradistrict splits caused by prior decisions by panel
members. See supra Part III.B. During the desegregation battles, the Chief Judge of the Fifth
Circuit also purportedly selected judges for statutory three-judge courts based on their
willingness to adhere to Supreme Court precedent. See BASS, supra note 153, at 223 (noting
an “unwillingness to assign judges who demonstrated a disregard for clear precedent in civil
rights cases to sit on three-judge district courts that heard such cases”).
394. See, e.g., Bookman & Noll, supra note 21, at 772 n.24 (gathering literature).
395. See, e.g., id. at 778.
396. See W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 260–61 (1953) (“It is
essential, of course, that a circuit court, and the litigants who appear before it, understand the
practice—whatever it may be—whereby the court convenes itself en banc.”).
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Further, as the history of district court en bancs bears out, the need for
collective proceedings will continue to evolve, and district judges might
benefit from flexibility to devise new forms of collective adjudication or to
continue refining the best practices gathered here. Of greatest concern,
codification would inevitably encourage greater use of district court en
bancs—or at least a greater demand for them. Setting out the procedure in
advance provides judges with a hammer looking for a nail. Overuse in the
short-term could cause problems—in terms of judicial dynamics, district
resources, and appellate backlash—that may lead to the rejection of the tool
in the long term.
Nonetheless, if a district did desire to codify a process for collective
decisions, the local rule should encompass the following considerations: the
specific rationales that would justify the procedure, who may call for the en
banc proceeding, who may vote, what vote would trigger the en banc, who
would participate in the hearing and decision, and how the hearing might be
conducted (e.g., whether judges may participate remotely). Districts may
also wish to specify briefing procedures, opportunities for broader
engagement (i.e., the appropriateness of amici curiae), and methods for
promoting transparency, such as a commitment to posting any resulting
decisions on the district court’s website.
CONCLUSION: THE EVOLVING FEDERAL COURTS
In an era when the Supreme Court is micromanaging the district courts’
handling of high-profile cases,397 the remedial powers of the district court
are under attack,398 and district judges seem increasingly hesitant to disagree
with or challenge decisions—even dicta—of higher courts,399 district court
en bancs serve as a useful reminder of the potential power of the district
courts.400 The district courts handle the vast majority of the federal
judiciary’s business and address daily fundamental issues of constitutional
law, civil rights, interstate commerce, and criminal punishment. They bear
the brunt of new legal and societal challenges, and their ingenuity is often the
397. See supra note 18 (gathering sources).
398. See supra note 19 (gathering sources).
399. See generally Neal Devins & David Klein, The Vanishing Common Law Judge?, 165
U. PA. L. REV. 595 (2017) (arguing that judges have become less willing to challenge, disagree
with, or cabin higher court precedent).
400. For other recent accounts of the power of the district courts, see Richard M. Re,
Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921 (2016) (describing how
district courts can cabin novel holdings in Supreme Court precedent); Neil S. Siegel,
Reciprocal Legitimation in the Federal Courts System, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (2017)
(describing how district courts may work in partnership with the Supreme Court to develop
constitutional law). For a review of these pieces, see Doni Gewirtzman, The High Power of
the Lower Courts, PUB. BOOKS (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.publicbooks.org/high-powerlower-courts/ [https://perma.cc/6BAS-LP4P] (noting that, “[m]ore often than not, lower court
judges are either entirely missing from accounts of American constitutional law, or portrayed
as dutiful agents of the Supreme Court, proudly displaying their ‘What Would SCOTUS Do?’
bumper stickers as they mindlessly enforce the Court’s proclamations about what the
Constitution means,” and warning that “this act of collective academic amnesia” obscures “a
vision of the federal judiciary that looks less like The Office and more like Silicon Valley”).
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vanguard for procedural and administrative reform. Yet their voice is
naturally fragmented and their authority often overshadowed by courts
higher in the judicial hierarchy. Collective adjudication provides one means
for the district courts to speak with an amplified voice. As Professor Todd
Henderson wrote of the Supreme Court, “[t]he content of opinions is
obviously an essential element of [the court’s] power, but . . . so is the style
or manner in which they are issued.”401
The district courts have used that amplified voice at critical moments of
social and judicial change, moments that have in turn led to procedural or
institutional shifts for the federal judiciary. The emergence of multi-judge
districts, the rise and then fall of three-judge courts, the development of
circuit court en bancs and the “law of the circuit” doctrine, the creation of the
modern class action and multidistrict litigation, reforms to local rulemaking
and case assignment rules—all of these changes bear on and are reflected in
district judges’ use of voluntary collective proceedings. Tracing the history
of district court en bancs, then, also serves as a reminder of the constant
evolution of the federal courts.402 The structure of the courts today, from
their three-level hierarchy to the size and docket of the Supreme Court, is
historically contingent. It would be foolish to assume that the current status
quo is either perfect now or will continue to function effectively despite
changing conditions.403 From this perspective, procedural innovation is
something to be nurtured, and the current settlement of the federal courts’
institutional design is best viewed as but a waystation on a longer journey
that is still in progress.

401. Henderson, supra note 324, at 3.
402. For descriptions of this evolution, see the sources gathered in supra note 16; see also
Yeazell, supra note 224, at 640 (tracing shifts in appellate oversight of district court work and
emphasizing that “one should not make the mistake of thinking of the relative positions of trial
and appellate courts as stable”).
403. As Frankfurter and Landis wrote a century ago, “Framers of judiciary acts are not
required to be seers; and great judiciary acts, unlike great poems, are not written for all time.
It is enough if the designers of new judicial machinery meet the chief needs of their
generation.” FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 16, at 107; see also id. at 5–6, 6 n.10
(describing the experimental nature of the First Judiciary Act and asserting that “these
experiments should not be regarded as unalterable”).
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APPENDIX
* Includes judge(s) from another district
† Includes senior judge(s)

Case
Portland Ry., Light & Power Co. v.
City of Portland, 200 F. 890 (D. Or.
1912)
Portland Ry., Light & Power Co. v.
City of Portland, 201 F. 119 (D. Or.
1912)
Seattle, R. & S. Ry. Co. v. City of
Seattle, 216 F. 694 (W.D. Wash.
1914)
Hannah & Hogg v. Clyne, 263 F. 599
(N.D. Ill. 1919)
Birmingham Tr. & Sav. Co. v.
Atlanta, B. & A. Ry. Co., 271 F. 743
(N.D. Ga. 1921)
United States v. Innelli, 286 F. 731
(E.D. Pa. 1923)
In re Comins, 1 F.2d 388 (W.D. Pa.
1923)
Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v.
City of Seattle, 300 F. 441 (W.D.
Wash. 1924)
United States v. Am. Brewing Co.,
296 F. 772 (E.D. Pa. 1924)
In re Eberhardt, 1 F.2d 347 (W.D. Pa.
1924)
Albert M. Travis Co. v. Heiner, 299
F. 677 (W.D. Pa. 1924)
United States v. Grossman, 1 F.2d
941 (N.D. Ill. 1924)
Beatty v. Heiner, 10 F.2d 390 (W.D.
Pa. 1925)
Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. Chi., M. &
St. P. Ry. Co., 13 F.2d 129 (W.D.
Wash. 1926)
Knapp v. Byram, 21 F.2d 226
(D. Minn. 1927)
United States v. Napela, 28 F.2d 898
(N.D.N.Y. 1928)
United States v. Reilly, 30 F.2d 866
(E.D. Pa. 1929)

Judges
Joining
Decision

Active
Judges404

2

2

Constitutionality of
Local Ordinance

2

2

Constitutionality of
Local Ordinance

2

2

Constitutionality of
Local Ordinance

2*

2

War Powers
Act/Prohibition

2*

1

Bankruptcy/Labor

2

3

Warrants (Volstead
Act)

2

3

Bankruptcy

3*

2

Constitutionality of
Local Ordinance

2

3

Warrants (Volstead
Act)

3

3

Bankruptcy

2

3

Tax

2

3

Contempt

2

3

Tax

2*

2

Bankruptcy

3

3

Remand

2

2

3

3

Topic

Warrants (Volstead
Act)
Challenge to
Criminal Indictment

404. See Courts, Caseloads, and Jurisdiction, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/
history/courts/u.s.-district-courts-and-federal-judiciary [https://perma.cc/YU9Y-Y35W] (last
visited Feb. 4, 2022).
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Judges
Joining
Decision

Active
Judges404

3

3

State Rate-Setting

2

2

Warrants (Arrest)

5

5

Discipline

4

5

Discipline

2

4

Bail Pending Appeal

3

3

Bankruptcy

2*

1

Constitutionality of
Federal Statute

3

3

Bankruptcy

3

4

In re Young, 12 F. Supp. 30 (S.D. Ill.
1935)

2

2

In re Schoenleber, 13 F. Supp. 375
(D. Neb. 1936)

2

2

4

4

Bankruptcy

4

4

Bankruptcy

4

4

Bankruptcy

2

2

Bankruptcy

3

4

Subject Matter
Jurisdiction/Labor

4

4

Venue/Jones Act

5

5

Bankruptcy

6

6

Discipline

3

4

Subject Matter
Jurisdiction/Labor

3

3

Subject Matter
Jurisdiction/Labor

5

5

Discovery

4

6

Discipline

Case
Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Odell, 45 F.2d
180 (E.D. Mich. 1930)
United States v. Wingert, 55 F.2d 960
(E.D. Pa. 1932)
In re Rowe, 4 F. Supp. 35 (E.D.N.Y.
1933)
In re Schachne, 5 F. Supp. 680
(E.D.N.Y. 1934)
United States v. Delaney, 8 F. Supp.
224 (D.N.J. 1934)
In re Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 8 F.
Supp. 51 (E.D. Pa. 1934)
In re Constitutionality of
Frazier-Lemke Act, 9 F. Supp. 575
(E.D. Ark. 1934)
In re Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 11 F.
Supp. 865 (E.D. Pa. 1935)
Gold Medal Foods, Inc. v. Landy, 11
F. Supp. 65 (D. Minn. 1935)

In re Stein, 17 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. Pa.
1936)
In re Collins Hosiery Mills, 18 F.
Supp. 89 (E.D. Pa. 1937)
In re Clover Drugs, Inc., 21 F. Supp.
107 (E.D. Pa. 1937)
In re Anderson, 22 F. Supp. 928
(D.N.D. 1938)
The Wind, 22 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Pa.
1938)
The Swiftarrow, 34 F. Supp. 541
(E.D. Pa. 1940)
In re Jay & Dee Store Co., 37 F.
Supp. 989 (E.D. Pa. 1941)
In re Chopak, 43 F. Supp. 106
(E.D.N.Y. 1941)
James v. Int’l Brotherhood of Boiler
Makers, 54 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Cal.
1944)
Yoerg Brewing Co. v. Brennan, 59 F.
Supp. 625 (D. Minn. 1945)
Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479
(E.D. Pa. 1945)
In re Chopak, 66 F. Supp. 265
(E.D.N.Y. 1946)

Topic

Constitutionality of
Federal Statute
Constitutionality of
Federal
Statute/Bankruptcy
Constitutionality of
Federal
Statute/Bankruptcy
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Case

Beckwith v. Am. President Lines,
Ltd., 68 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Cal.
1946)
Gibson v. Int’l Freighting Corp., 8
F.R.D. 487 (E.D. Pa. 1947)
Alameda v. Paraffine Cos., 75 F.
Supp. 282 (N.D. Cal. 1947)
Linde Air Prods. Co. v. Johnson, 77
F. Supp. 656 (D. Minn. 1948)
Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 76 F.
Supp. 178 (E.D. Mich. 1948)
Hayes v. Chi., R.I. & P.R. Co., 79 F.
Supp. 821 (D. Minn. 1948)
United States ex rel. Smith v. Warden
of Phila. Cnty. Prison, 87 F. Supp.
339 (E.D. Pa. 1949)
United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy,
97 F. Supp. 930 (M.D. Pa. 1951)
United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi,
96 F. Supp. 100 (E.D. Pa. 1951)
Prentiss v. Nat’l Airlines, Inc., 112 F.
Supp. 306 (D.N.J. 1953)
United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy,
130 F. Supp. 270 (M.D. Pa. 1955)
Smallwood v. Days Transfer, Inc.,
165 F. Supp. 929 (W.D. Mich. 1958)
Nat’l Sur. Corp. v. Chamberlain, 171
F. Supp. 591 (N.D. Tex. 1959)
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cook, 172 F.
Supp. 710 (N.D. Tex. 1959)
Dziwanoski v. Ocean Carriers Corp.,
26 F.R.D. 595 (D. Md. 1960)
In re Kovrak, 194 F. Supp. 204 (E.D.
Pa. 1961)
In re Bennethum, 205 F. Supp. 821
(D. Del. 1962)
Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp.
476 (D.N.J. 1962)
United States v. Wallace, 222 F.
Supp. 485 (M.D. Ala. 1963)
Ellis v. Mayor & City Council of
Balt., 234 F. Supp. 945 (D. Md.
1964)
Pontes v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 256 F.
Supp. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1966)
Schiff v. Hannah, 282 F. Supp. 381
(W.D. Mich. 1966)
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Judges
Joining
Decision

Active
Judges404

4†

4

Remand/Jones Act

5

6

Discovery

3

4

2

4

5

5

2

4

5

6

Habeas

2

2

Habeas

7

8

Habeas

2

6

Constitutionality of
State Statute

2

2

Habeas

2

2

Joinder

3

3

3

3

3†

2

3

8

Discipline

2

3

Discipline

(all)405

7

Discovery

5*

1

School
Desegregation

3

4

Apportionment

3

10

Venue
Transfer/Labor

3†

2

Student Discipline

Topic

Subject Matter
Jurisdiction/Labor
Subject Matter
Jurisdiction/Labor
Subject Matter
Jurisdiction/Labor
Venue
Transfer/Labor

Subject Matter
Jurisdiction
Subject Matter
Jurisdiction
Discovery/
Longshoremen

405. The designation “(all)” signifies that the opinion noted the concurrence of all the
district’s judges in the decision without listing the concurring judges by name.
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White v. Swenson, 261 F. Supp. 42
(W.D. Mo. 1966)
In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D.
Va. 1967)
United States v. Cohen, 275 F. Supp.
724 (D. Md. 1967)
Slomberg v. Pennabaker, 42 F.R.D. 8
(M.D. Pa. 1967)
United States v. 4,400 Copies of
Mags., Entitled “Cover Girl” &
“Exciting,” 276 F. Supp. 902 (D. Md.
1967)
Olivieri v. Adams, 280 F. Supp. 428
(E.D. Pa. 1968)
Close v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 44 F.R.D.
398 (E.D. Pa. 1968)
Turner v. Transportacion Maritima
Mexicana S.A., 44 F.R.D. 412 (E.D.
Pa. 1968)
United States v. 127,295 Copies of
Magazines, More or Less, Entitled,
“Amor,” 295 F. Supp. 1186 (D. Md.
1968)
Conley v. Lake Charles Sch. Bd., 293
F. Supp. 84 (W.D. La. 1968)
Pedicord v. Swenson, 304 F. Supp.
393 (W.D. Mo. 1969)
Whittenberg v. Greenville Cnty. Sch.
Dist., 298 F. Supp. 784 (D.S.C. 1969)
Conley v. Lake Charles Sch. Bd., 303
F. Supp. 394 (W.D. La. 1969)
Arthur v. Schoonfield, 315 F. Supp.
548 (D. Md. 1970)
Bass Angler Sportsman Soc’y v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.
Ala. 1971)
Calhoun v. Cook, 332 F. Supp. 804
(N.D. Ga. 1971)
United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F.
Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1971)
Snead v. Am. Export-Isbrandtsen
Lines, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 148 (E.D. Pa.
1973)
Movement Against Destruction v.
Volpe, 361 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Md.
1973)
Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp. 1249
(N.D. Ga. 1973)
Nortown Theatre Inc. v. Gribbs, 373
F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Mich. 1974)
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Judges
Joining
Decision

Active
Judges404

4

5

Habeas

3

3

Discipline

3

5

Criminal Jury
Selection

(all)

3

Discovery

5

5

First Amendment

3

13

4

13

4

13

Consolidation/
Longshoremen

2

5

First Amendment

3

3

School
Desegregation

4

5

Habeas

4

4

3

3

2

5

Habeas

3*

8

Environmental

2

6

School
Desegregation

(all)

15

Prison Conditions

3

18

Discovery

2

7

Environmental

2

6

School
Desegregation

2

10

First Amendment

Topic

Subject Matter
Jurisdiction
Consolidation/
Longshoremen

School
Desegregation
School
Desegregation
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Case

Lucas v. “Brinknes” Schiffahrts Ges.
Franz Lange G.m.B.H. & Co., 379 F.
Supp. 759 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
Mims v. Dixie Fin. Corp., 426 F.
Supp. 627 (N.D. Ga. 1976)
Lopez v. Franklin, 427 F. Supp. 345
(E.D. Mich. 1977)
Hurst v. Hogan, 435 F. Supp. 125
(N.D. Ga. 1977)
United States v. Salanitro, 437 F.
Supp. 240 (D. Neb. 1977)
Crown Ctr. Redevelopment Corp. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 82 F.RD.
108 (W.D. Mo. 1979)
United States v. Anaya, 509 F. Supp.
289 (S.D. Fla. 1980)
United States v. Wright, 516 F. Supp.
1119 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp.
914 (E.D. Va. 1981)
Kohr v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,
522 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
Hamby v. Zayre Corp., 544 F. Supp.
176 (N.D. Ala. 1982)
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v.
One Parcel of Land in Montgomery
Cnty., 549 F. Supp. 584 (D. Md.
1982)
In re Color Craft Press, Ltd., 27 B.R.
962 (D. Utah 1983)
United States v. State of Hawaii, 564
F. Supp. 189 (D. Haw. 1983)
Lovallo v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp.,
99 F.R.D. 627 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
In re All Asbestos Cases Pending in
the U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Md.,
No. BML-1, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10719 (D. Md. Dec. 16, 1983)
Bradley v. Milliken, 585 F. Supp. 348
(E.D. Mich. 1984)
In re G.L.S., 586 F. Supp. 375 (D.
Md. 1984)
Parker v. Bell Asbestos Mines, Ltd.,
607 F. Supp. 1397 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
In re Asbestos Litig., 628 F. Supp.
774 (D.N.J. 1986)
In re Issuance of Warrants by Clerks,
674 F. Supp. 1182 (W.D.N.C. 1986)
In re Roberts, 75 B.R. 402 (D. Utah
1987)
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Judges
Joining
Decision

Active
Judges404

3

18

Longshoremen

6

6

Joinder

2

10

Immigration

5

5

Habeas

3

3

Grand Jury

4

5

Discovery

12

12

Challenge to
Criminal Indictments

2

19

Contempt

3

7

Discipline/Mass Tort

4

19

Mass Tort

7†

6

Remand

6†

10

Takings

4†

3

Bankruptcy

3†

2

Prison Conditions

3

19

Mass Tort

6

8

Consolidation/
Mass Tort

3

11

School
Desegregation

10†

9

Discipline

3

18

Mass Tort

14†

14

Mass Tort

3

3

Warrants (Forfeiture)

4

4

Bankruptcy

Topic
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Judges
Joining
Decision

Active
Judges404

3

4

Bankruptcy

3

3

Discipline

4†

4

Bankruptcy

United States v. Johnson, 682 F.
Supp. 1033 (W.D. Mo. 1988)

5†

7

United States v. Bolding, 683 F.
Supp. 1003 (D. Md. 1988)

13†

9

United States v. Macias-Pedroza, 694
F. Supp. 1406 (D. Ariz. 1988)

6

8

United States v. Ortega Lopez, 684 F.
Supp. 1506 (C.D. Cal. 1988)

24†

22

United States v. Allen, 685 F. Supp.
827 (N.D. Ala. 1988)

10†

7

United States v. Brittman, 687 F.
Supp. 1329 (E.D. Ark. 1988)

(all)

5

United States v. Bogle, 693 F. Supp.
1102 (S.D. Fla. 1988)

16†

15

United States v. Molina, 688 F. Supp.
819 (D. Conn. 1988)

(all)

6

United States v. Williams, 691 F.
Supp. 36 (M.D. Tenn. 1988)

3

3

United States v. Serpa, 688 F. Supp.
1398 (D. Neb. 1988)

2

3

Dondi Props. Corp. v. Com. Sav. &
Loan Ass’n, 121 F.R.D. 284 (N.D.
Tex. 1988)

11†

10

Attorney Standards

United States v. Swapp, 695 F. Supp.
1140 (D. Utah 1988)

5†

4

Constitutionality of
Sentencing
Guidelines

Greer v. Skilcraft, 704 F. Supp. 1570
(N.D. Ala. 1989)
Belgian Am. Invs. & Trade, Inc. v.
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 717 F.
Supp. 462 (N.D. Tex. 1989)
City Fire Equip. Co. v. Ansul Fire
Prot. Wormald U.S., Inc., 125 B.R.
645 (N.D. Ala. 1989)

9†

7

Remand

9†

10

Remand

8†

5

Bankruptcy

Case
In re Indep. Clearing House Co., 77
B.R. 843 (D. Utah 1987)
In re Tyler, 677 F. Supp. 1410 (D.
Neb. 1987)
In re Ret. Inn at Forest Lane, Ltd., 83
B.R. 795 (D. Utah 1988)

Topic

Constitutionality of
Sentencing
Guidelines
Constitutionality of
Sentencing
Guidelines
Constitutionality of
Sentencing
Guidelines
Constitutionality of
Sentencing
Guidelines
Constitutionality of
Sentencing
Guidelines
Constitutionality of
Sentencing
Guidelines
Constitutionality of
Sentencing
Guidelines
Constitutionality of
Sentencing
Guidelines
Constitutionality of
Sentencing
Guidelines
Constitutionality of
Sentencing
Guidelines
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Case

Keatley v. Food Lion, Inc., 715 F.
Supp. 1335 (E.D. Va. 1989)
Fasi v. Cayetano, 752 F. Supp. 942
(D. Haw. 1990)
Ainsworth v. Vazquez, 759 F. Supp.
1467 (E.D. Cal. 1991)
In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 142
F.R.D. 60 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y.
1992)
In re Masini-Soler, 882 F. Supp. 23
(D.P.R. 1995)
In re Paoli, 932 F. Supp. 51 (D.P.R.
1996)
In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F.
Supp. 958 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y.
1996)
In re Starr, 986 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D.
Ark. 1997)
United States v. Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d
304 (E.D. Va. 1999)
Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149
(W.D. Wash. 1999)
United States v. Vidal-Cruz, 67 F.
Supp. 2d 35 (D.P.R. 1999)
In re Smith, 100 F. Supp. 2d 412
(N.D. Tex. 2000)
In re McTighe, 131 F. Supp. 2d 870
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